GERMANY'S PARIAH HUNT WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER

THE NATION

JULY 5 1975 50 cents

WITHDRAWN

Our Man at the U.N.
MOYNIHAN AND THE THIRD WORLD
ST. CLAIR DRAKE

Coleman Report II
COURTS, BUSSING & WHITE FLIGHT
MAURICE deG. FORD

RADICALISM AS COMMON SENSE
The Office-Holding Activists
James Rowen

Herbert Gans / Popular and High Culture
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LETTERS

men in flight

Bergenfield, N.J.
I agree with Dr. George Silver's editorial call [*The Nation*, June 21] for the entry of more women into medicine. However, the outcome may be a bit different from what feminists might logically expect. Historically, when women have assumed a dominant position in a profession, their presence has tended—in a seeming variation on Gresham's law—to drive men away from it, and to reduce the profession's social/cultural status. That happened to nursing—once a male-dominated profession. And, it seems to be happening in various parts of the world as the woman doctor or dentist becomes almost a norm.

Comparable illustrations may be drawn from other fields: retailing, the culinary arts, and the like.

It is not enough simply to bring significant numbers of women into a profession. Some way must be found to keep significant numbers of men in the same profession.

JoAnn Bozarth Menkus, Director
Educational and Occupational Information Service

knows what she likes

New York City
What ordinary mortal who loves the ballet, theatre or concert would deign to comment on four columns of harangue on *Spartacus* and *Ivan the Terrible*? Yet, I am too incensed at Nancy Goldner's obvious belittlement of Yuri Grigorovich, the great Bolshoi choreographer, to let it pass [*The Nation*, May 24]. . . .

I don't know anything about dance except what pleasure or pain it brings to the audience participant. I do know that *Spartacus* and *Ivan* and its performers Vasiliev and Bessmertnova and company brought such overwhelming excitement, joy and sorrow that no other dance group ever approached it. . . .

Goldner . . . also has a lot to say about the demeaning of the women dancers. Our party at the Met thought Bessmertnova *and* Vasiliev equally magnificent and sensuous in their love scenes, as well as every scene. It appears to me that Goldner deeply dislikes dance-dramas like *Spartacus* and *Ivan* and even thinks the Prokofiev and Khachaturian scores are "excruciating." This viewer would recommend to the reviewer to stick to the conventional *Swan Lake*, etc., ballets exclusively, and not go to see the spectacular spectacles the Bolshoi presents to American audiences! I could not agree more with Clive Barnes who said "These were the supreme of the supremes." *Irene H. Rubens*

Christians in Islam

New York City
Congratulations to Francis Sarguis and Benedict Beit-Ishoo for writing—and to *The Nation* for publishing [May 31]—the very timely and much needed article, "Between Iraq and Iran: Assyrians on the Millstone." Much attention has been given by the American news media to the recent problems of the Kurds in Iraq but, to my knowledge, this is the first public mention of the Assyrians' plight, which is even worse than that of the Kurds because of the Assyrians' smaller numbers and their religion—Christianity in the middle of a Moslem world! It's high time to bring before the U.S. public the precarious position of the oldest Christian ethnic group. Surely these noble descendants of an illustrious ancient empire deserve both our sympathy and our support in their efforts "to retain a grip on their identity and 'pride of nation.'" *Elinor Turner*

The editors welcome letters from readers but regret that space limitations often prevent publication of those of more than 250 words.

EDITORIALS

Decent Jerry

"You're honest and decent," former Pennsylvania Gov. William Scranton once reportedly told President Ford. Increasingly, if Scranton is right, Ford's behavior seems to be at odds with his personality. While no one has yet accused him of the legal grafting that pervaded the Nixon White House, the doublethink that marked Nixonian language is creeping into Ford's vocabulary, the arrogant neglect that signaled the Nixon domestic policy has started to infiltrate what once was seen as the deeply felt conservativism of Gerald Ford.

Ford's recent consecutive speeches on government regulation of business and government involvement in uranium production indicate the manipulative duplicity of his—or his advisers'—turn of mind. One day Ford—with typical right-wing aplomb—denounces government involvement in the marketplace, implying with at least a bit of truth, that it does not necessarily work to the advantage of the consumer. Shortly afterward, in a speech with a surface of free-enterprise rhetoric, Ford advocates the denationalization of a portion of the atomic industry—and then urges government guarantees for the private interests who he says should replace public employers. Troubling questions of safety aside, Ford wants to have it both ways—private profits and socialized losses—a scheme designed to benefit his ruling-class supporters at taxpayer and consumer expense.

Though Ford's once-vaunted honesty will likely grow shakier as the 1976 election comes nearer, his "decency," never very profound if the word is taken to mean kind or generous, is increasingly belied by his behavior. His economic policies—high unemployment as a solution to inflation—never evinced concern for struggling Americans; his vetoing of the food-stamp increase early in his term exposed at the start his lack of compassion for the hungry. But lately, his usual insensitivity has taken an aggressive turn. On the same day that it carried the front-page headline, "First Lady in Town for Gala Evening" (Betty Ford had attended a benefit for the Martha Graham Dance Company in New York), the New York *Daily News* ran a valuable column by James Wieghart, appropriately titled: "Washington Fiddles While You-Know-What Burns." Ford himself would not dare show his face in New York; his cruel dismissal of Mayor Beame's and Governor Carey's appeal for help has made him unwelcome.

New York's fiscal problems, as Wieghart points out, are worse than those of any other city in the country. But they are not, as Ford and his advisers contend, solely the result of mismanagement. New York has been consistently short-changed by the federal government; Ford may be ideologically hostile to its costly efforts at providing basic social services for its citizens, but that does not excuse his indifference to a crisis caused largely by federal failure to recognize as a national problem and responsibility the consequences of massive immigration into one city from the most decimated and oppressed parts of the country. Wieghart reports that "dozens of other cities are on the brink" of fiscal crisis; many are being forced to cut back

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services by federal indifference to their problems. Cities are being disproportionately disabled by Ford's pro-unemployment policies. That he sees no need to suggest compensation, that he shrugs off their trauma, that he ignores the entreaties of a mayor from his home state—Coleman Young of Detroit—these attitudes raise questions about his concern for that sizable sector of the American public that lives and works in urban complexes.

In an open letter to the President, published in the current issue of *Lithopinion*, editor and union local president Edward Swayduck questions Ford's candor and concern. In one particularly vivid example, Swayduck probes the image Ford and his advisers have striven to create—and the contrary one revealed by Ford's everyday administrative actions. Writes Swayduck:

> Your public relations staff keeps presenting you as a humble man of the people. And you yourself never lose an opportunity to talk about the necessity of thrift in government and Spartan living in general. I saw in *The Wall Street Journal* a few months ago that you were saying that "Washington cannot ask others to show spending restraint unless government demonstrates its own commitment" to thrift. "We cannot afford optional luxuries while striving to beat inflation."
>
> That's what you said. But, then, what did you do? You spread a kingly feast for regional governors in Atlanta and Houston, sending in planes from Washington loaded with gold-etched White House dinnerware on which was served what you consider a "restrained" dinner—fresh lobster flown down that day from Maine, bibb lettuce sprinkled with chrysanthemum leaves, prime ribs of beef, braised Belgian endive, hearts of celery, artichokes, zucchini stuffed with imported mushrooms, Chinese pea pods, Belgian carrots, tomatoes Provençale and *pommes rosettes*.
>
> For dessert there was a bombe with chocolate topping, plus fresh strawberries flown in from California and petits fours.
>
> And you served two wines and a champagne.
>
> Mr. Ford, in some of our cities, needy people have recently been seen scrounging for food in garbage cans. . . .

Ford has a long way to go before he can truthfully be called "honest and decent" by any meaningful standard. Advisers like Scranton would do well to remind him of his responsibilities to the American people.

The Spy Circus

If any significant action comes from the numerous investigations of the CIA it will be a miracle. Consider, for example, some of the recommendations of the twelve-member Commission for Reorganization of the Government's Foreign Policy, headed by former Ambassador Robert Murphy. The report, which will be released on June 30, proposes that the CIA's name should be changed, that the director should come from outside the agency, and that he should be given broad powers over the entire intelligence establishment. The CIA has of course a bad name in Europe, Africa, the United States, Latin America, Asia and island chains from the Aleutians to Micronesia, so

SUMMER SCHEDULE

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The Nation is published weekly (except the issues of January 4, July 12, July 26, August 9, August 23) by the Nation Company and copyright 1975 in the U.S.A. by the Nation Associates, Inc., 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10014. Tel: CH 2-8400. Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y.

Subscription Price: One year $15; two years, $27.50. Add $1 per year postage for Canada and Mexico; $2 other foreign.

Change of Address: It is essential that subscribers ordering a change of address give four weeks' notice and provide their old as well as their new address. Please give Zip Code numbers for both addresses.

Manuscripts. All work submitted will be read by the editors. The magazine cannot, however, be responsible for the return of unsolicited manuscripts unless they are accompanied by stamped, self-addressed envelopes.

THE NATION

Volume 221
No. 1

The Sherrod Library
EAST TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY
Johnson City, Tennessee

JUN 30

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changing its name would not be a bad idea. But that will not cope with the problem the agency presents. Similarly, choosing a director from outside the service is not a bad idea, but will not prevent a repetition of the assorted abuses of power of which the CIA stands convicted. Putting all the intelligence agencies under the direction of one man, responsible to the President, could be more dangerous than the arrangement that now exists. The problem with the CIA is that it evolved as part of the process which created after World War II what Alan Wolfe, in a perceptive *Nation* article (March 29) labels "the dual state." One side of that state consists of government as usual, as we had known it before the war. The other side consists of a network of powerful agencies, related to the military, largely under executive control, and dedicated to the conduct of the kind of foreign policy the major power groupings in this country feel is essential for the protection of their interests. Hence the insistence that we must have a "secret intelligence agency," whether it is called the CIA or the National Agency for Furtherance of Better Group Relations, is a strategy which if successful can only buttress the military-intelligence side of the dual state.

Since the very concept of the dual state is alien to the thinking of the designated critics of the CIA, it is perhaps too much to hope that they might want to question the assumption that we really need "a secret intelligence agency." Yet the debate would be clarified if we were to raise that question and thereby force the defenders of the agency to prove their case.

The late Sir Compton Mackenzie knew a great deal about secret intelligence agencies and came to regard them as a major threat to peace. Some of what he had to say on the subject bears repeating today. In an article entitled "The Spy Circus," which appeared in *The Nation* of December 5, 1959, Sir Compton recognized the need for the protection of certain kinds of secrets—scientific information, etc.—and for espionage in wartime. But he pointed out that what we suffer from now is the "peacetime" spy, who, in nine cases out of ten, is not a spy at all but an agitator or propagandist, "whose alleged activities are an excuse for officialdom to waste vast sums of money on counterespionage." He pointed out that there is really no way to control how money is spent by such agencies and went on to say that the parasites encouraged by intelligence agencies are the most noxious of all because their existence depends on their "being able to produce the conditions in which they can flourish." And he added:

> Secret intelligence work has a progressively lowering effect upon the intelligence of those who are engaged upon it, particularly at a high level. Three years are the very utmost a man should be retained in a position of such responsibility. His view of human nature becomes steadily more and more distorted and his judgment of political motives less and less sound. He outgrows his ability to give reassuring advice to the executive, because an improvement in international relations threatens his own career. He becomes chained to prejudice and mistrust. Under his influence those below him come to regard common sense as a threat to intelligence. . . . During the First World War, British Intelligence collected over 30,000 names for a secret black list. . . . From time to time I would ask for the removal of names whose innocence had been established by further investigation. Could I get one of those names removed? Not one. . . . I could relate a hundred stories of almost equal fatuity by intelligence, but the public, fed by spy-thrillers and television with pretended true stories of Secret Service adventures, likes to believe in such fairy tales. . . . Nevertheless I owe it to my conscience to declare that the effect of intelligence work on international understanding is perhaps the greatest threat facing peace today.

This view is not as far-fetched as it may seem. For example, we now know that the CIA tried to recruit Cyrus Eaton, the Cleveland industrialist and ardent peace advocate. "They said I had extraordinary contacts in Communist countries, and that I was in a position to get all kinds of information. I told them that under no circumstances would I be a part of a spy organization. I said I would talk about my observations with serious and responsible agencies of the government, but under no circumstances would I be a spy." First of all, an espionage agency that would attempt to recruit Cyrus Eaton is excessively stupid. But an agency that would attempt to compromise him, and thereby endanger his important initiatives for peace, stands convicted of criminal wrongdoing. Not only did the CIA's actions deny it—and other agencies—the benefit of Mr. Eaton's shrewd insights into Soviet affairs but similar efforts at recruitment have denied the government the observations and conclusions of many responsible Americans who are eager to cooperate with their government but resent any attempt to enlist them in a "secret intelligence agency." Similarly, an agency that would protect an agent guilty of participating in a plot to smuggle 100 pounds of raw opium into the United States, worth $3.5 million on the streets when converted into heroin, is in literal fact a criminal agency. Yet we now know, thanks to the *Chicago Daily News*, that the CIA forced the Department of Justice to drop an indictment against its agent.

So on the basis of known facts the public is entitled to insist that the defenders of the CIA tell us what it has done that makes it, in their view, the indispensable agency. At the same time, the public is entitled to a specification of the assorted idiocies of which the agency stands convicted. Then a reasoned judgment might be formed as to what disposition should be made of the CIA.

'Bits and Pieces'

The President is said to be distressed by the constant dribble of "bits and pieces" of incomplete information about assassination plots which may or may not have been authorized by the White House during earlier administrations. But he himself set the tap dripping back in January, when he had what he thought was an off-the-record chat with certain reporters about his concern that coming investigations might turn up references to high-level talk about assassination plots. Since then, "bits and pieces" of gossip and disclosure, usually with a reference to the Kennedys, have been a more or less daily occurrence. The dribbling reached a climax of a sort when Vice President Rockefeller said on a nationwide broadcast that, while he had no proof that the Kennedys knew of CIA assassination plots, still they might have. He then added: "I think it's fair to say that no major undertakings by the CIA were done without either prior knowledge and/or approval of the White House." White House is, of course, a vague reference.

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Even so, Sen. Edward Kennedy was justified in pronouncing the statement "utterly irresponsible," the more so as the Rockefeller Commission had decided not to proceed with the assassination phase of its CIA investigation.

But the Vice President did make one point that deserves emphasis when he referred to the "poor memories of individuals still alive" who served with the two Kennedys. Some of these individuals have been unable to recall meetings that would seem to have been of more than passing interest, nor have they been able to remember whether they saw memoranda of meetings at which assassination plots are said to have been discussed. There are, for example, references to such a meeting held in August 1962, and attended by Messrs. McNamara, Rusk, McCone and Bundy. The Rockefeller Commission is said to have a copy of a memorandum based on this meeting. Mr. McNamara cannot recall the meeting. One source is quoted as saying that the subject of assassinations was raised but dismissed; it was kept "in the woodwork." Maj. Gen. Edward Lansdale is reported to have said that in 1961 Robert Kennedy asked him to prepare a secret contingency plan to dispose of Castro. He is also quoted as being unable to recall writing a memorandum in August 1962 which dealt with plots to assassinate Castro, but he didn't rule out the possibility that such a memorandum had been written or that it existed. Lawrence Houston, retired general counsel of the CIA, when asked about underworld reports of such a plot, replied: "I do not recall such a thing, but that doesn't mean it didn't happen. I won't deny it, but I don't remember anything like that." Such quotes naturally whet the curiosity of the press and public; that, perhaps, is why they have found their way into print. Given the number and persistence of these "bits and pieces" of information, starting with the President's statement in January, the public has a right to insist that Senator Church and his committee, no matter how painful the task may be, should make known whatever facts they can unearth that bear on the question of whether other Presidents, or the White House, were aware of or sanctioned assassination plots. To back away from that issue would be a serious mistake.

Domestic Tranquillity

They've been a long time coming, but President Ford has finally revealed his proposals for solving the crime problem. Though strong on rhetoric, in substance they amount to little more than closing the eyes and hoping it will go away.

Ford has abandoned the Nixon catch phrase "law and order" in favor of the more dignified "domestic tranquillity." It doesn't play as well, but it's just as meaningless in terms of honest attempts to limit crime. One of Ford's main substantive proposals seems to be handing an additional $6.8 billion over to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the fund conduit that doles out money to states and local police—too often for fancy hardware and gadgetry. As *Time* points out, LEAA's failure "to lower the crime rate suggests that more money for the nation's 500,000 men in blue will not help much." According to *Time*, Gerald Caplan, LEAA research director, admits: "There have been no breakthroughs and none are on the horizon."

In a similarly symbolic pronouncement, Ford called for minimum mandatory sentences for certain violent crimes and multiple offenses. His proposals, whatever their intrinsic merits, would have virtually no effect on domestic tranquillity in America: they apply only to federal crimes and, as John Crewdson pointed out recently in *The New York Times*, in 1973, for example, only 39,000 prosecutions out of 1.5 million nationwide were federal.

Ford also tried to pull a quick one on uncritical listeners by suggesting that the epidemic of gun-related crimes could be significantly affected by banning the domestic manufacture, assembly or sale—but not possession—of the portion of those guns known as Saturday Night Specials. Imports have been banned since 1968. Though Ford claimed his proposals "go to the very heart of the problems of handgun abuse," Jack Corbett, head of the National Coalition to Ban Handguns, told the *Los Angeles Times* they were among the weakest of any gun-control measures advocated in Washington.

Senator Kennedy called Ford's gun strategy "far off the mark. Banning Saturday Night Specials may be a politically appealing ploy to appease those who oppose effective gun controls," Kennedy said, adding that he questioned the effectiveness of banning the production and sale of only one type of gun. "There is simply no place in our society for any weapon that can instill in one person the power over others that is so readily available when a gun is in hand." Kennedy said that 40 million civilian-owned handguns were in circulation.

But Ford's purpose was to obscure, not to try to solve, the problem of violent crime in American society. He fell into the old right-wing rhetoric about switching the emphasis of concern from the criminal to the victim—and generally tried to project a hard line.

Yet Ford gave it all away when he said flatly: "I am unalterably opposed to federal registration of guns or gun owners." Both gun-toting criminals and members of the National Rifle Association can smile over that. Ford has pleased them and, in the process, has told Congress that it will have to fight if it wants real gun control.

Ford and Wallace

The press has been more surprised by the sharp drop in Governor Wallace's ratings in the polls than it has been by President Ford's equally sharp increase. Yet comparison of the two sets of polls suggests that the President's increase may in large part account for Wallace's drop. The polls reflect a shift in sentiment of approximately equal magnitude. Of course, from an analysis of these polls, the opposite cannot be said—that the President's improved rating can be explained by the drop in Wallace's standing—but certain facts lend support to such an inference.

Ford has staked out for himself what he calls the Center position, but is in fact the conservative position. He intends, we are told, to run a campaign that will be, in effect, a showdown between conservatives and liberals (whatever these terms may mean in today's confused political scene). He will appeal to business in terms that business will understand and applaud; he has a strong anti-crime program (with a small bow in the direction of Edward Levi, the Attorney General, in the form of legislation on

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handguns); he will be against spending except for defense and related matters; he will crusade against inflation, not for jobs; he will give the back of his hand to blacks and ignore the plight of the cities; and he will pose as a "strong national leader" in foreign affairs.

This is *precisely* the Wallace appeal. Ford's rhetoric is cooler and his manner less pugnacious, but between the two men's positions there really is no difference. There is this added circumstance: Ford is much more vigorous than Wallace. Indeed, the President's physical endurance is something to marvel at. Now if Ronald Reagan should be nominated for Vice President—and he might be despite the President's kind words for Rockefeller—the nation would be presented with the "dream" conservative ticket: plain Gerald Ford of Grand Rapids with his ready smile and easy handshake, and Ronald Reagan of Hollywood, star of radio, film and television, the beau ideal of the right-wing conservatives. The President, according to *Variety*, will campaign as the Bicentennial candidate and will visit every "burg" in the country, picking his appearances as political circumstances may dictate. He will speak on good patriotic themes and will say, again and again, that it would be inappropriate for him to talk politics, that is, issues and problems, from Bicentennial flag-draped platforms. The media will provide him with excessive coverage wherever he goes. Of course many things can happen in the coming year, but at the moment Ford leads all Democratic hopefuls, including Senator Kennedy, in the usually reliable Field poll in California (June 17).

The Morgentaler Case

Dr. Henry Morgentaler, a Canadian physician, might be described as a histrionic abortionist. He says that he has illegally terminated some 5,000 pregnancies and he once performed an abortion on Canadian national television on Mother's Day. Give Dr. Morgentaler credit for having the courage of his convictions. On the other hand, his dramatic espousal of these convictions was certain to precipitate a highly emotional reaction in the largely Catholic province of Quebec. The fact that his case has been taken up by groups in the United States that cannot fairly be called "anti-Catholic," but are so regarded by the Church, has also contributed to the tumult and the shouting. And in Quebec latent undercurrents of anti-Semitism have no doubt been aroused.

But for all this, Dr. Morgentaler has been treated abominably. Two juries have refused to convict him, but the prosecution has taken the unprecedented action of appealing these acquittals—appeals that would not be allowed under British or American law. He is already serving an eighteen-month sentence after the Supreme Court of Canada, in a 5-to-4 decision last October, found him guilty of performing an illegal abortion. Not satisfied with that action, Quebec authorities are continuing to prosecute eleven identical charges against him. Dr. Morgentaler, a victim of Nazi concentration camps, has suffered a heart attack and continued imprisonment may endanger his life.

Under a Canadian law enacted in 1969, an abortion may be performed legally only in specified hospitals after a standing committee of three doctors at the hospital has certified that continuation of pregnancy would be likely to "endanger" the woman's life or health. But the act has been interpreted in such a way that legal abortions are rare indeed. In May, 116 Quebec doctors publicly challenged the Minister of Justice by admitting that they had performed illegal abortions or had referred women to places where they could be performed. No action was taken against them. The effect of the narrow interpretation of the 1969 statute, as Dr. Augustin Roy, president of the Quebec College of Physicians and Surgeons has said, has been to force women to go to New York State or "to butchers on kitchen tables and to charlatans in back rooms."

The Morgentaler case raises once again the danger of permitting a highly emotional issue, with religious overtones, to become the subject of public controversy. Opinion has promptly polarized and, in the process, a gross miscarriage of justice has been defended by authorities who know better but who refuse to perform their duty for fear of reprisal by their constituents. A petition carrying a million signatures—almost 5 per cent of Canada's population—has been delivered to Parliament Hill in Ottawa, demanding that the abortion law be made even tougher. Even so, it is hard to believe that Canadian justice will continue to ignore the mistreatment of Dr. Morgentaler, however intense the feelings of Quebec Catholics about him. Incidentally, in a Gallup poll of Canadians last September, on the question of whether abortion should be a decision solely for the woman and her doctor, 62 per cent of those questioned were in favor and 31 per cent opposed. This suggests that the case is being used as a political weapon to rally additional support for the anti-abortion position. But the continued harassment of Dr. Morgentaler may have exactly the opposite effect, which is the kind of reward his persecutors deserve.

'Charitable Politics'

Three years of investigation have turned up a series of bank scandals in Missouri that are a mirror image of the corporate delinquency revealed by the Watergate inquiries. What it boils down to is that selected banks were used as depositories for interest-free state deposits. Some $36 million in demand deposits of general revenue were shared by seven banks from 1969 to 1972. Some of these deposits fluctuated only slightly, so that a bank's profit on the use of the fund was substantial. Inevitably, this arrangement involved the banks in politics, which in turn got them into all sorts of fancy "laundering" operations, involuted committees, rigged campaign contributions and the rest of it. Strange transactions were entered into which made it possible for political fixers to make neat profits in the sale of municipal bonds on loans provided by the banks, with the profits being used to finance political campaigns. One of the slush funds was named Charpol or "charitable politics." Through Charpol nearly $1 million was funneled to various campaigns. The question of interest-free bank deposits is one that has cropped up in a number of states, New York included, and it warrants further investigation.

What is depressing about the Missouri bank scandals, expertly reported by the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, is the persistent interpenetration of politics and business, in this instance, the banking business. In fact it would be difficult

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to determine where the line was drawn, if it was drawn at all. The bankers were deeply involved in politics; the politicians were deeply involved with bankers. It is this mutually supportive system that should be placed on trial; the indicted bank officials and politicians emerge as puppets—the system's victims of the moment. The muckrakers of Lincoln Steffens' day tore into "the system" because their investigations had convinced them it was the prime social target. Steffens, of course, would find the Missouri scandals boring and repetitious. The ritual of purification will be played out precisely because it *has* become a ritual, but the system will survive the trials—it always has.

GERMANY'S PARIAH HUNT

The Bundestag vs. the Terrorists

WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER

To most outsiders, West Germany seems the very model of a democratic society. Its Basic Law, the "temporary" constitution drafted by the occupying powers in 1949, goes considerably further than its American counterpart in granting every imaginable human right, from the "free development of personality" to the "secrecy of mail and telecommunications." A year ago, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Basic Law, pledged his country "to an open society which leaves room for a multiplicity of views and social groups."

Yet the Bundestag, in an attempt to inhibit the Red Army Faction (RAF), an urban guerrilla group colloquially known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, has enacted sweeping laws designed to destroy the power of RAF members to defend themselves against serious criminal charges growing out of their activities. The legislation, which became effective this year, is in open conflict with the constitution's express guarantee of the equality of everyone before the law. In addition, it starkly recalls the denial to certain classes of persons of any meaningful legal rights in the courts of the Third Reich.

Among other things, the new acts provide that a court may refuse to allow criminal defendants to be represented by counsel of their choice if it decides that the latter have identified too closely with their clients. A criterion for reaching the conclusion that a particular lawyer should be excluded for this reason has already been suggested by one tribunal—that the attorney in question had used words or expressions similar or comparable to those employed by the defendant. That was the basis for the exclusion of Klaus Croissant, a Stuttgart lawyer representing an RAF client—a move that had failed under the old law. On June 23, West German police arrested Croissant and Christian Stroeble, another RAF attorney, on charges of supporting a criminal conspiracy.

William Kunstler, a criminal trial lawyer, was co-counsel in the recently concluded Attica case of Dacajeweiah (John Hill). He also served as trial counsel in the Chicago 7 conspiracy case and in the defense of Dennis Banks and Russell Means in the Wounded Knee leadership prosecution. In December 1974 he went to Germany at the request of RAF defendants, hoping to be admitted either as an attorney or as an adviser, but was refused by the German courts.

Once a counsel of choice has been refused the right to participate in a case, the court can then appoint replacements more favored by the state, even over the client's strenuous objection. Moreover, a defendant will not be permitted to select more than three lawyers in any one prosecution, but the court may still appoint others who will have equal standing with those chosen by him. Finally, in trials of multiple defendants, no lawyer is now allowed to stand up for more than one accused, thus making it impossible, as a practical matter, for the small number of German lawyers still available to defend certain controversial clients to do so.

Under existing law, lawyers in a multi-defendant prosecution may be guilty of conspiracy if they disclose their individual trial plans to one another. The framers of the new legislation, conscious of its intended target, have also empowered judges to interrupt a defense lawyer if they consider his arguments to have political implications. Because jailed RAF members have embarked on periodic hunger strikes, there is now included a provision that, if a defendant is too weak or ill to attend court, the trial can proceed without him.

As if this weren't bad enough, the Ministers of Justice of the Federal Republic and the various states have just proposed a further measure which would virtually destroy the confidentiality of oral and written communications between attorneys and their incarcerated clients. But such a law, if eventually enacted by the Bundestag, would only formalize procedures that have existed for some time in this "open society which leaves room for a multiplicity of views and social groups." Recently, the Minister of Internal Affairs published and widely circulated a booklet containing twenty-nine documents, including those containing lawyers' recommendations as to legal strategy and their opinions of the anticipated unfairness of certain judges—all of which had been seized from the cells of imprisoned RAF members or obtained in illegal police raids on their homes and offices. A more blatant violation of the essential attorney-client privilege cannot be imagined.

The effect of such repressive legislation can best be seen in the trial of Ulrike Meinhof, Gudrun Ensslin, Andreas Baader and Carl Raspe, four alleged leaders of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, which opened in Stuttgart on May 21 under conditions of unprecedented security. The defendants, charged with murder, bombing and robbery, have been denied counsel of their choice simply because

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their lawyers are "suspected" of conspiring with their clients. Just days ago, for example, Baader's three defense attorneys were finally forbidden to represent him because of such unproved "suspicions."

His lawyers having been dismissed, Baader was given just five days in which to replace them. It is difficult to imagine a more disastrous state of affairs for a defendant facing the most serious of criminal charges than to be forced to find new counsel more than two weeks *after* the commencement of his trial. It is not surprising that Baader, after the forced removal of his entire legal team, complained bitterly to the five-judge court that he was tired of all the "legalistic package surrounding this affair, but now I need a defending lawyer."

I was recently interviewed by Jürgen Offenbach, the political editor of the *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, a middle-of-the-road daily newspaper, who first stated as a fact that the lawyers for the Baader-Meinhof Gang were, in effect, involved in some of the criminal acts of their clients. When pressed for proof, Herr Offenbach readily conceded that there was no hard evidence to support such a charge, but that the lawyers were "probably" guilty. While professing his dislike of any law impinging on the lawyer-client relationship, he said that, since the Baader-Meinhof Gang were all "criminals" anyway, he did not feel that, in their case, there was any real need for concern.

Moreover, some RAF suspects have been kept in pretrial detention for as long as three years without ever seeing a courtroom. Held in solitary confinement and, as noted by Charles Lam Markmann, in a recent issue of the American Civil Liberties Union's *Civil Liberties Review*, subjected to such "exquisite tortures as deliberate sensory deprivation tactics designed to eliminate the basic stimuli essential to normal functioning—sound, light, shadow, color, movement, touch, and sometimes, water," many of these defendants have been crippled for life. A 1972 request by the European Commission for Human Rights for an explanation of two years of such treatment meted out to one young RAF woman has been ignored by the Bonn government.

Not only does such barbarous conduct fly squarely against Chancellor Schmidt's ringing words but it raises the specter of an accelerating retreat to a most dangerous past. The seriousness of the situation can perhaps be best emphasized by the strange and frightening fact that almost no one outside the Federal Republic is even vaguely aware of what is happening to imprisoned RAF members or of the oppressive legislation inspired by their alleged activities. As once before, laws and procedures designed to control or eliminate one group regarded as dangerous by the state may eventually spread to include even those who today are among their most ardent supporters.

A failure to understand that the repression of the pariahs of the moment almost inevitably leads to the repression of all ignores history's most painful lessons. Or, to update Pastor Niemoeller, "When they came for the RAF, I did not protest because I was not a member. . .and then they came for me." □

OUR MAN AT THE U.N.

MOYNIHAN AND THE THIRD WORLD

ST. CLAIR DRAKE

"MOYNIHAN CALLS ON U.S. TO 'START RAISING HELL' IN THE U.N." That was how *The New York Times* of February 26 headlined Kathleen Teltsch's report of an interview with Daniel Patrick Moynihan in the offices of the Commission on Critical Choices for Americans. He had just returned from a two-year stint as ambassador to India where, according to James Reston, he had been a "good" and "cautious" emissary, and had made "only four public statements, two of them in the last two weeks of his mission. . . ." Now Moynihan was suggesting that if any vulnerable nations should criticize others on issues such as, for instance, the holding of political prisoners, "We should rip the hides off. . .shame them, hurt them, yell at them!" Diplomacy *via* Billingsgate, with prospects of turning the Assembly into a fish market, is not really "Pat" Moynihan's style, nor is setting off such a brouhaha probably his real intent. These words seem more like political hyperbole or the language of dramatic metaphor. Both the setting of the interview and the tone, as well as the selection of *Commentary* (March 1975 issue) for another of his "definitive" announcements or pronouncements that appear periodically in that journal, suggest that he was playing to a specific audience—and one that was not the object of his sadistic verbal sally. A few weeks after the *Commentary* article appeared, the press began to discuss the fact that Moynihan was being seriously considered as ambassador to the United Nations. The Senate has recently confirmed him for that post after a surprisingly brief period of questioning, given the extensive prior press coverage.

Reston had noted in the *Times* that Moynihan was under attack in some quarters for being "too blunt, too dramatic and combative." But Reston's column, "In Defense of Talkers," suggested that he is "maybe precisely what the U.S. needs at the U.N. in the coming years. . . ." On the other hand, John Scali, whom Moynihan will replace, criticized him by implication when he told the Senate committee that "unless we move with care and understanding our confrontation with the Third World will worsen. . . . Our language, our posture, can enhance or set

St. Clair Drake, professor of anthropology at Stanford University and member of the Committee on African Studies, is a former Ford Foundation Fellow in West Africa and was from 1958 to 1961 chairman of the Department of Sociology at the University of Ghana. Mr. Drake, along with Horace Cayton, is author of Black Metropolis (*Harcourt Brace Jovanovich*).

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back the prospects of compromise. . . ." Yet, Don Shannon, of the *Times* Washington bureau, comparing the two men, sees the new appointment as "a change of medium not of message. . . ." The *Commentary* article in which Moynihan spelled out his position was referred to occasionally in the general press but was seldom criticized, Garry Wills being one of the few columnists to recognize the extent to which it is both inaccurate and patronizing toward Third World peoples. He characterized Moynihan as "a florid combination of Oxford don and Colonel Blimp . . . ." Reston was sure, however, that the sentiments expressed in that article were "precisely why Ford nominated him." Richard Stout of *The Christian Science Monitor* spoke with approval of the "witty, convivial and articulate Moynihan" who is going to provide some electrifying debates at the U.N., and William Buckley, defending him against a British attack, reminded his readers that he had once said of Moynihan that he has "the lowest level of crap toleration in the United States." Reston deemed it crucial to say that the new U.N. ambassador is more than "an articulate and intelligent dramatic personality," and to warn that "the stereotype of Moynihan as a poetic and vaguely wild Irishman is really out of focus. . . ." That may, indeed, be true, but the attempt to sell him as a man with "a sense of history" ignores both the insensitivity that he has displayed over the past decade and some very serious flaws in the *Commentary* article.

Moynihan went to Harvard in the mid-1960s in the role of what the news magazines called an "urbanologist"—to direct the Joint Harvard-M.I.T. Center for Urban Studies. He is now a professor of government and the author of half a dozen books that reveal considerable skill as an editor and an unusual ability to write about his own participation in public affairs in an interesting and intelligible fashion. He has a flair for marshaling apt quotations from his extensive and eclectic reading, but his choice of them, coupled with his misuse of statistics, sometimes gets him into trouble. Throughout his career Moynihan's scholarship has been subordinated to advocacy, and he employs data to justify programs of action, not to test hypotheses. There is nothing wicked or even surprising about that; after all, he is a graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, which is not a center for training social science research personnel. Those who come from such backgrounds should expect to be written about and argued about as politicians, not as social scientists—except when they insist that what they write has scholarly validity, as the *Commentary* article does.

After an unsuccessful venture into New York electoral politics, Moynihan became very successful in Washington. I suspect that the small group of Afro-American "Moynihan watchers" that came into existence when it was announced that he was the person who in 1965 had written *The Negro Family: A Case for National Action* were not surprised by the bellicose stance of the interview, the "triple talk" and inaccuracies in the *Commentary* article—or his being "tabbed" for U.N. ambassador. From the relative anonymity of a Department of Labor post and an inconspicuous spot on Lyndon Johnson's anti-poverty task force, he went on to directing the Harvard-M.I.T. urban program, to advising Nixon on how to deal with Negroes and convincing him to support a guaranteed family income, to the U.N. Assembly as a delegate and, then, to India as Ambassador! They have watched the fantastic speed with which he soared out into international political space, using the "Moynihan Report" on the Negro family as a launching pad (winning fame in a field where he had no expert knowledge). Two confidential advisory memoranda for Nixon—one on "the Negro lower class," and the famous "Benign Neglect" item—operated as second-stage booster rockets. "Third World Problems" constitutes a logical third-stage rocket for propulsion out of the gravitational field of domestic politics into an orbit where ordinary politicians may become transformed into international "culture heroes," if not into statesmen. Moynihan is now imposing upon the Third World certain attitudes and political orientations that brought him widespread recognition on the domestic front, winning approval from "conservatives" and eliciting a burst of outrage from Afro-American leaders.

Moynihan's formula for success embodies the possibly sincere conviction of a political pluralist as to what the historic moment requires, polarization into sharply divergent ideological camps in either domestic or international politics being undesirable. He stated at a national meeting of Americans for Democratic Action in 1967 that "Liberals must seek out and make more effective alliances with political conservatives who share their interests. . . ." But Moynihan has never specified the degree of compromise, or "whitewashing," or of deliberate game playing, a liberal-in-coalition can permit himself and still remain a "liberal," or retain the respect of either or both sides. He tries in the *Commentary* article to carry water on both shoulders when he writes with exuberant exaggeration:

> International liberalism and its processes have enormous recent achievements to their credit. One example is the multinational corporation which, combining modern management with liberal trade policies, is arguably the most creative international institution of the 20th Century. [Characteristically, Moynihan left himself an "escape hatch" by inserting the word "arguably."]

Senator Percy had been calling for a stiffening U.S. policy toward the multinationals, and when confirmation time came the Senate committee questioned Moynihan a bit about some items on bribes that were then in the news. *The Christian Science Monitor* reported: "Disarmingly, Mr. Moynihan shifted ground. . . .'Did I say they were without sin?' "

At the 1967 ADA meeting, Moynihan had conceded a point to some of his more vocal critics, while indicating where he believed the major area of power and influence in America lay:

> Martin Luther King, Jr. and many other liberals are no doubt correct in holding that the war in Vietnam has stalemated government efforts on behalf of Negroes at home, but they are wrong, I think, in their proposed solution: the American national government in this age will always give priority to foreign affairs. . . .

Yet, domestic affairs were uppermost in Moynihan's mind in those days—the period of ghetto rebellions from 1964 to 1968—and he expressed constant concern over what he referred to in one address as an alliance between "radical nihilistic white youth" and a black "underclass," a "disor-

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ganized, angry, hurt group of persons easily given to self-destructive violence. . . ." He persistently blamed the existence of that "underclass" on the "weak" Negro family, refusing to focus on teen-age unemployment, poor ghetto schools and the sense of alienation arising from racism. Two years before this ADA speech he had argued in *The Negro Family* (1965) for getting more black youth prepared to pass Army entrance examinations, since: "If the more than 100,000 unemployed Negro men were to have gone into the military, the Negro male unemployment rate would have been 7 per cent in 1964 instead of 9.1 per cent." His additional comments showed a tendency to confuse cause and effect, and ignorance of Afro-American family life. They also revealed offensive attitudes of *machismo*:

> There is another special quality about military service for Negro men. It is an utterly masculine world. Given the strains of the disorganized and matrifocal family life in which so many Negro youth come of age, the Armed Forces are a dramatic and desperately needed change: a world away from women, a world run by strong men of unquestioned authority, where discipline, if harsh, is nonetheless orderly and predictable, and where rewards, if limited, are granted on the basis of performance. . . .

Moynihan's preoccupation with race and ethnicity and law and order during this period led him to say, in an address at the New School for Social Research, soon after Martin Luther King's death: "I feel that future historians, relieved of our 19th-century preoccupation with the appearance of industrialization and the issue of who would control the artifacts thereof, a preoccupation, in other words, with issues such as capitalism, socialism and communism, will also see that the turbulence of these times here and abroad has far more to do with ethnic, racial and religious affiliation than with these other issues. . . ." Whether seven years have altered a view that subordinates economic factors in history we do not know, but the *Commentary* article suggests that he may be shifting from one theory of determinism to another.

Despite his theory of the primacy of racial and ethnic factors, Moynihan during the 1960s had berated those who specified "white racism" as the basic cause of black ghetto violence. He insisted upon stressing what others saw as derivative phenomena and as *intervening* variables—the "weak" black family and the "tangle of pathology" in some black communities. Moynihan was also highly critical of sociologists who pointed out a connection between juvenile delinquency and violence on the one hand, and denial of opportunity for upward mobility and full participation in the society on the other. He was aggressively opposed to federally sponsored community action programs because, as he saw it, in *Understanding Poverty*, the "function of many of these programs as they actually came into being was to raise the level of perceived and validated discontent among poor persons with the social system about them, without actually improving the conditions of life of the poor in anything like a comparable degree. Can it be that this process has not somehow contributed to and validated the onset of urban violence?" Discussing the Kerner Report, he noted: "One commentator, appalled by the too-eager embrace of the 'white racism' verdict—an acceptance not in the least associated with an apparent national impulse to do anything about the conditions described—concluded that 'all that this exercise in blame-fixing offers [the Negro] is an official nudge toward paranoia.' " The New School speech expressed his special scorn for "radical chic" and a strong prejudice against some not clearly defined forms of social action: "Liberals must somehow overcome the curious condescension that takes the form of defending and explaining away anything, however outrageous, which Negroes individually or collectively do. . . ."

These perspectives have now been transferred to the world scene. The *Commentary* article was giving advice to a conservative Administration on how to deal with rambunctious and intractable Africans, Arabs, Asians and Latin Americans, functioning in a loose coalition with several varieties of Communist U.N. member states. Moynihan was at the same time seeking liberal approval for the policy.

He points out in *Commentary* that the United States has been forced to accept what is for this nation a most unpleasant, disconcerting fact of life. The Third World coalition and its allies in the General Assembly and specialized agencies have been outvoting the United States and its supporters, and this pattern is likely to continue. During the 29th General Assembly the phenomenon so prevailed that Moynihan accepts the description of it as "tyranny of the majority." He notes with some exaggeration that "we were frequently reduced to a voting bloc which, with variations, consisted of ourselves, Chile and the Dominican Republic. . . ." What hurts most, however, is that debates often include abuse of "Western imperialism," "neocolonialism" and sometimes of the United States itself.

Faced with this loss of esteem and power, some American conservatives have suggested that the United States get out of the U.N. Moynihan reminds them that withdrawal will not wreck the U.N. and gives an example: "Anyone who doubts that Dubai can pay for UNESCO knows little of UNESCO, less of what the United States pays and nothing whatever of Dubai." Since the U.N. is going to survive, it is to the interest of the United States to remain in it, especially with regard to such matters as arms control and planning for use of sea-bed resources. Yet, since U.S. national pride and prestige *are* at stake, he suggests that while the country can continue to play an active role in specialized agencies and a powerful one in the Security Council where it wields the veto, the Assembly should be viewed as a legislative body in which U.S. representatives can "sound off," being vigorous and aggressive in debate—challenging, exposing, criticizing.

He proposes that the United States lead an energetic "parliamentary opposition." That is common-sense, practical advice, obviously calculated to win applause from Middle America. But Moynihan, conceiving of himself as the "intellectual" in politics, can't leave the matter at that. He must provide *theoretical* justification for the action, making it a matter of principle instead of the best course in a bad situation. So he erects a windmill to tilt at, insisting that there is "a distinctive ideology at work in the Third World. . . ." This may be true, but to say that these nations have "essential ideological *coherence*," and that it is a product of what he calls a "British Revolution," is to substitute fantasy for political science. He insists that only

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.e British type of parliamentary opposition will satisfy, and that that demands a "coherent" majority which one can oppose. The Communists cannot supply it because they aren't unified and they don't play parliamentary games according to parliamentary rules. (Maybe détente also has something to do with by-passing them.) The Third World "new nations," however, can provide the opposition with the coherent majority it needs if debate is to move forward. To defend this concept he advances a very "iffy" demographic proposition, namely, that by 1950 "not Communists but Fabians could claim that the largest portion of the world's population lived in regimes of their fashioning. Before very long the arithmetical majority and the ideological coherence of the new nations brought them to dominance in the United Nations, and indeed in any world forum characterized by universal membership." That is an amazing statement in which the wish is father to the "facts."

There must be gremlins in Professor Moynihan's computer, for it is simply not so that, by 1950, most of the people in the world lived under regimes "fashioned" by British Socialist thinking. At the time, at least a billion people were living under various kinds of Communist regimes and another half-billion were living in the United States, Japan, Indonesia, Brazil and Mexico, plus still more in Latin America and Asian-Oceanic areas who had not been even remotely influenced by British Socialist ideas. Only by the most generous stretching of the concept "under British influence" can one produce a figure of a billion people to match the non-British billion and a half. And of these, 115 million were in the "white" sector of the Commonwealth, which was by no means uniformly Socialist.

"They've Obviously Never Heard of 'Benign Neglect' "!

The new nations, even now, have a combined population substantially under a billion. Of these, Moynihan states: "By the time of the granting of independence, all were democratic with a Socialist intelligentsia and often as not a Socialist government." Now it would be more accurate to say that *few* were democratic, since the franchise was restricted and colonial governors had the power to suspend constitutions and to hold people in preventive detention; the indigenous intelligentsia were eclectic in ideology and, when they came to power, set up nations with mixed economies often modeled after the Indian four-sector economic system: private, public, mixed and cooperative.

He makes the amazing assertion that the colonies were dominated by a London School of Economics-trained civil service (where were all the Uxbridge people?), and that it propagated a version of socialism that was "biased" (*sic*) against economic development, since ". . . *redistribution, not production, remained central to the ethos of British socialism.*" This allegation distorts British Fabian economics as well as the intentions of Third World nations when they insist upon higher prices for raw materials and lower prices for manufactured goods. It also pins the "Socialist" label on economies that are not that at all. Furthermore, Moynihan argues that these British colonial civil servants allegedly poisoned the minds of the people with extremely anti-American propaganda, disliking the United States because it was "quintessentially capitalist." They carried out a political socialization job that convinced the "natives" that profit and economic injustice were synonymous and that they were victims of exploitation and racial discrimination. "What the civil service began, British education completed," Moynihan assures us.

If any such "coherent ideology" was actually spread throughout the Empire and Commonwealth by civil servants, the pattern certainly must have been broken in the Middle East among the 40 million people there who were "under British influence." Could anyone seriously contend that the bureaucracies of Ibn Saud and Hussein as well as those of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates were suborned by Harold Laski? What of Aden and Somalia, Yemen and Bahrain? And asking us to believe, as he does, that Arab and African leaders who supported each other at the Lima Conference in 1971 did so because they "had all gone to the same schools" is asking a bit much.

The largest single bloc of Third World intellectuals influenced by Fabian socialism was probably in the Indian subcontinent, with which Moynihan has had some contact, but one would have to stretch the term to include both Nehru and Gandhi under the same rubric. And Nepal and Bhutan were probably not affected at all by the Coles and Webbs, or by Cripps and Laski.

Only twelve of the thirty-nine *African* "new nations" were formerly British. The kings of Swaziland and Basutoland, before their countries became independent, were not under Fabian influence, although Bechuanaland (Botswana) did have close ties with British Labour through Seretse Khama. In most of the other nations, the leaders

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had working relations with individuals and groups in Labour Party circles, but to say that any of them had a "coherent" Fabian ideology is to reveal an ignorance of the situation that is inexcusable. The late Kwame Nkrumah, that favorite whipping boy of the American press, always referred to himself as a "Marxist Socialist and a nondenominational Christian," and treasured the memory of the eleven years he spent in the United States above the one spent at the London School of Economics. He very rarely criticized the United States, and a month before he was overthrown was praising the Kaiser enterprises for building Ghana's $160-million Western-financed hydroelectric project, including a privately owned aluminum smelter! Many of the British African nationalist leaders studied in the United States, among them Banda of Malawi, Azikiwe of Nigeria, two of Kenya's cabinet members, and legislators everywhere. They had extensive circles of friends, white and black. Once in power, they continuously sought financial backing for industrialization projects and never rejected grants for improving managerial skills. Only some of them professed to be Socialist, but even those were aware that their progress depended upon increased productivity.

Of the African new nations, eighteen were formerly French. I dare say that Leopold Senghor, a French savant who was conversant with Marxism before he rejected it for his own variety of "humanistic socialism," would be amused by any suggestion that he was influenced by the Fabians. And to explain Fanon in terms of either British socialism or Second International social democracy is laughable. What then of Amilcar Cabral, whose keen mind led Guinea-Bissau to independence and left us an extensive body of theoretical literature? The following countries were neither British nor French in background: Zaïre, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia and Libya. Gadaffi's strictures against the United States certainly can't be blamed on British socialism.

Moynihan's troubles do not derive entirely from faulty arithmetic. There is a basic ill-conceived conceptualization. Being at the same time intelligent and cunning, he knew he was on a "sticky wicket" with this idea that a "British revolution" had generated a coherent Socialist ideology that animates the United Nations majority. Some *Commentary* readers would buy the argument for one reason or another, but others wouldn't and Moynihan knew it. So he wrote a long footnote in which he tried to say that only a semantic problem was involved. He conceded: "The term British revolution is open to objection as seeming to exclude the influence of continental socialism on the new nations, and indeed a good case could be made for calling the phenomenon I am trying to describe the revolution of the Second International. . . . I anticipate and hope for a rigorous critique of the arguments of this paper, but I also hope it will not be too much distracted by the difficulties of finding a concise term to describe what was on the whole a concise phenomenon: the development of Socialist doctrine and the formation of Socialist parties in Western Europe. . . ." But more than terminology is involved. The phenomenon isn't that "concise," and if the term "*British* revolution" is not really accurate, why then devote a whole article to discussing the impact of Western Europe upon nations as a *Fabian* impact? One possible answer is that this strategy is useful for "putting down" and denigrating Third World leadership. That is an old Moynihan compulsion.

Moynihan has carried over to the international sphere certain traits he displayed in dealing with black Americans—mild but patronizing contempt for their own chosen leaders, a "father-knows-best" attitude with regard to their crucial problems, the use of white Western values and institutions as criteria for judging the values of Third World peoples, and a certain persistent manipulativeness. In his "Benign Neglect" memorandum he referred to the "usefulness" of the several maneuvers he suggested to Nixon. Now, he writes, "The Third World has more than its share of attractive regimes, and some attractive indeed—Costa Rica, Gambia and Malaysia to name but three. . . ." One could ask, "Why these three instead of, say, Barbados, Ghana and Burma?" What standards of "attractiveness" are being applied is not clear, but some Third World cynic is going to inquire, "Is one of those countries on the list because it gives refuge to that organizer of multinational corporations who's trying to evade trial in America?" People who struggled hard for their own national liberation will not accept the glib half-truth that "*A third of the nations of the world today owe their existence to a statute of Westminster.*" Do we simply ignore Satyagraha and Nkrumah's nonviolent positive action campaigns? Do we eliminate Haganah and Irgun and the Stern gang from history, along with Mau Mau? And were there no strikes in the Caribbean, Zambia and the Sudan, and no demonstrations and boycotts in Nigeria? This theory of independence by British grace is just as offensive, with its imputation of docility, as is the implied imbecility in his repeated statements that Third World peoples had to be taught by British Fabians to want independence, or even to recognize themselves as exploited and discriminated against. (Note the same syndrome in Moynihan's article on Wiley's Welfare Rights Organization in the April issue of *Crisis*.)

Moynihan's refusal to accept concepts of "exploitation" and "reparations" as valid is an international extension of his oft-reiterated refusal to consider "white racism" in the United States as the basic cause of black poverty and social disorganization. The blame must always be placed on the victim, never on the systematic victimization. For instance, he writes of Third World countries that the United States must tell them that their "economies do less well than they ought: *that the difference is of their own making and no one else's, and no claim on anyone else arises in consequence.* This will be hard for us to do but it is time we did it." (Italics added.) That same attitude was taken earlier when he criticized the Kerner Report and blamed ghetto disorders on self-perpetuating values within the black community. Now, for the Third World, an iniquitous value system is what hampers economic growth and that is defined as British Fabian socialism!

Moynihan believes that economic failures in the Third World will open the door for the Communists. (He makes a dangerous error, however, when he says that pro-Moscow and pro-Peking parties are "everywhere." There have never been any in the overwhelming majority of the forty-odd African states.) He believes that only capitalist development in cooperation with the multinationals can prevent such failure, and at a recent annual meeting of the

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American Jewish Committee, he stated that "Americans should not be ashamed of free markets and free enterprise." After the speech, Norman Podhoretz, editor of *Commentary*, stated, "If people will not produce for profit, experience has shown that they will not produce at all . . . ." India is for Moynihan the classic example of economic "failure" and he generalizes from the case to say that "the managed economy was transmuted from an instrument of economic rationality to an instrument of political rationality. . . ." Or, putting it another way, that "the real attraction of the managed economy has been the means it provides to collect enough political power at the center to maintain national unity—almost everywhere a chancy thing in these generally multi-ethnic states."

Moynihan obviously knows why civil liberties are so fragile in the Third World countries, but he is quite prepared to use these deviations from Western political practices to "blast" them: "It is time that the American spokesman came to be feared in international forums for the truths he might tell. . . ." We are not told whether there is any specific goal to be achieved by such blasts, other than the fine glow of self-righteousness that will suffuse the U.S. delegate as he resumes his seat—and, of course, applause from conservatives in the gallery. Or does he plan to bargain with the blasts? "Vote with us and we won't expose you!" It would be virtually impossible for a U.S. delegate to use the journalists' favorite criticisms and accuse the Third World nations of nepotism, corruption, lavish consumption standards, laziness, inefficiency, etc. That kind of attack in the Assembly would not be tolerated by Asians, Africans and Latin Americans, and if made, would also offer a wide hole for Marxists to walk through by marshaling data on the "corrupting" influence of multinational corporations on local elites and of American standards of consumption (including Hollywood B—Grade films) on entire populations. So a special whipping boy is fabricated—British socialism.

Moynihan feels that we should be thankful that the majority which the United States confronts in the Assembly is Fabian and not totalitarian. (Where does he classify all those military dictatorships in Africa?) He states that "to have halted the great totalitarian advance (i.e., the Communist variety of totalitarianism) only to be outdone by the policies of resentment and the economics of envy would be a poor outcome to the promise of a world society." He quotes with approval a remark by Dahrendorf that the equality party has had its day and the liberty party's time has come once more. Doesn't it even occur to both of them that Third World peoples still have a long way to go before they will have economic, political or military equality vis-à-vis the wealthy and powerful West that preaches "liberty" and supports a wide variety of non-Communist dictatorships, including the Brazil that Moynihan speaks of with approval? It is legitimate to ask whether his major concern is democracy in the Third World or a free hand for those "creative" multinationals.

We were given a "preview" of Moynihan's U.N. performance at the confirmation hearings, where he pointed out that the multinational corporations have organized production all around the world "with peculiar zest," said he opposed mandatory U.N. sanctions against South Africa, and announced that we should tell the world that we will cut off all contributions to the U.N. and end participation in the General Assembly if Israel is expelled. Ford and Kissinger will have an aggressive defender of their policies. □

COLEMAN REPORT II

Courts, Bussing & White Flight

MAURICE deG. FORD

Cambridge, Mass.

Prof. James Coleman, principal author of the famous 1966 Coleman Report, *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, is in the news again. He is cited in the press as having changed his position on integration and court-ordered bussing. "A Scholar Who Inspired It Says Bussing Backfired," runs the front-page headline in a recent edition of *The National Observer*. Referring to the "loss" of Dr. Coleman, Nathaniel Jones, general counsel for the NAACP, laments that "the academic sector is just not reliable" as a civil rights ally.

A careful reading of a recent interview with Dr. Coleman suggests that, contrary to the headlines, he has really not "retreated" or grown that much more conservative on "forced bussing." But this does not really alter the issue, which is people's perceptions of what Coleman has been saying rather than what he actually said.

My purpose here is to present a more balanced coverage of the latest revised social science study, which we might call Coleman Report II. Just released, it is a preliminary report on the new study that he is doing for the Urban Institute on the effects of desegregation. His main conclusion, according to the extended interview published in *The National Observer*, is that an extensive "white flight" from the twenty largest school districts in the country is causing resegregation. There is some white outward migration also from the smaller school districts, but the problem is less severe. Asked what accounts for the difference, Coleman replies, "I'd say it has to do with the degree of security that parents have about their children in the two situations. In large cities, where the system often seems out of control, there's a much greater feeling of inability to have any impact on the schools, a feeling that schools cannot maintain order, and a feeling that the schools cannot protect the child." He believes, according to *The National Observer* interview, that "it's not entirely

Maurice Ford, a tutor at Dunster House at Harvard College, is at work on a book entitled "Southie Is My Home Town."

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lower-class blacks that middle-class whites are fleeing. They are fleeing a school system that they see as too large, as unmanageable, as unresponsive, to find a smaller, more responsive system."

Dr. Coleman is discouraged about the immediate effects of court-ordered bussing in large, particularly Northern, urban school districts. But contrary to the headlines he insists that he is not retreating from his former position. Anyone familiar with the findings of *Equality of Educational Opportunity* would have to agree with him. In that report, Dr. Coleman emphasized that *"per pupil expenditure, books in the library, and a host of other facilities and curricular measures show virtually no relation to achievment if the 'social' environment of the school—the educational backgrounds of other students and teachers—is held constant."* (Coleman's italics.) What was most important for meaningful racial integration and educational improvement was social class integration. And by "social class integration" Coleman meant not necessarily rich kids with poor kids, but kids from family and home atmospheres conducive to learning (even if the father was a church-mouse-poor minister) going to school with kids from educationally more impoverished home environments. The hope, based on the realization that children learn best from other children, was that some of the "culture" and constructive attitudes toward learning of the more advantaged "middle-class" kids would "rub off" on those less fortunate.

Civil rights attorneys and others who read the Coleman Report used its findings to buttress the case for metropolitan (that is, urban center plus suburbs) desegregation. For in a society where the central cities—such as Newark, Cleveland, Detroit, Oakland, Philadelphia—were becoming increasingly poor and black and ringed by comparatively affluent white suburbs, a metropolitan solution was clearly necessary. Attempts were made to correct the economic and racial disparities between the central cities and their surrounding suburbs through the courts. But by identical 5-to-4 votes the Supreme Court twice thwarted these attempts to have the findings of the Coleman Report influence constitutional law. In 1973, in *Rodriguez* v. *San Antonio School District*, the Burger Court, with the four Nixon appointees—Burger, Blackman, Powell and Rehnquist—joined by Justice Potter Stewart in the majority, held that, where educational expenditures were concerned, a federal district judge was powerless to eliminate financial disparities between the central city and its suburbs.

And just a year ago, the day after it handed down its decision in the Nixon "tapes" case, the same majority of the Court voted against metropolitan desegregation in the Detroit case. Federal district Judge Roth, who died just before the Supreme Court overturned his verdict, had ruled that the only way the Detroit public schools, which were becoming overwhelmingly black, could be desegregated was to involve the suburbs in a metropolitan remedy. In this he was backed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. But the Burger Court, perhaps conscious of pressures in Congress for a constitutional amendment banning forced bussing, said nay in *Bradley* v. *Milliken*.

Taken together, the Supreme Court's *Rodriguez* and *Bradley* decisions have tied the hands of federal judges. Many believe that if he had been allowed to do so, Judge W. Arthur Garrity would have compelled Boston's white suburbs to join with the central city to bring about equal educational opportunity. But after the Detroit decision he felt unable to do so. While a metropolitan school district may be larger than Coleman would like, a metropolitan solution would have brought about the social class integration that he still feels is indispensable.

In his *National Observer* interview Dr. Coleman says in detail why he feels that having a majority of middle-class children in each classroom is so crucial:

> The theory is that children who themselves may be undisciplined, coming into classrooms that are highly disciplined, would take on the characteristics of their classmates, and be governed by the norms of the classrooms. So that the middle-class values would come to govern the integrated classrooms. In that situation, both white and black children would learn. What sometimes happens, however, is that characteristics of the lower-class black classroom, namely a high degree of disorder, came to take over and constitute the values and characteristics of the classroom in the integrated schools. It's very much a function of the proportions of lower-class pupils in the classroom.

One may, of course, quarrel with the "middle-class norms" that Coleman espouses, and many blacks and educational theorists, notably Jonathan Kozol and John Holt, do quarrel with them. One may also wonder how social class integration can take place in the largest cities, and thus produce the educational climate Coleman desires, without some sort of metropolitan solution. He does not seem to have squarely faced this issue.

However, like Robert Coles before him, who tried to explain why the integration of lower-class Roxbury and lower-class South Boston would be a disaster, Coleman is not surprised by the tumult which has developed in Boston, that "Athens" of ethnic islands:

> Boston is a peculiar kind of metropolitan area, with a large proportion of the metropolitan area outside the central city, including most middle-class whites. The desegregation order was, of course [after *Rodriguez* and *Bradley*], limited to Boston proper, which meant that it involved primarily lower-class communities with strong ethnic ties, whites and blacks. Now under those circumstances, with most of the higher-achieving middle-class schools in the suburbs, one could hardly expect integration to have beneficial effects on achievement.

As an example of a solution which he hopes will work, Coleman points to the Louisville Plan. There a federal judge, distinguishing the pattern of segregation in Louisville from that in Detroit (as was recently also done with respect to the Wilmington, Del., public schools), has gotten around *Bradley* v. *Milliken* and ordered a metropolitan remedy. Under the Louisville Plan, children will attend neighborhood schools part of the time and be bussed to an integrated school (in surrounding Jefferson County) three days a week. Coleman believes that desegregation which follows this pattern will "reduce fears that lead to white flight."

Another hope for achieving integration, according to Coleman, lies in especially innovative and thoughtful

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Conrad, Los Angeles Times

"Nothing Unusual Happened on the Way to School Again Today."

educational programs—excellence at the end of the bus ride. "I think there has to be an incentive," he says, "either in government money and assistance or attractive programs. . . . What you need are positive inducements for families to keep their children in integrated schools. You can't create integration by court edict. In the larger cities, certainly, it's a very temporary matter." No one seems to agree with Coleman on this more fervently than Judge Garrity in Boston. He has involved twenty colleges and universities, as well as twenty business organizations in the metropolitan Boston area, to work with the Boston School Committee in creating a Magnet School Program, which he calls the "magic" of his desegregation order. (See Ford: "The Schools: Détente in Boston," *The Nation*, May 3.) If this partnership is able to overcome political obstacles and work, it may make the Boston public school system second to none.

A final intriguing aspect of Coleman's interview in *The National Observer* is his discussion of the courts' use of social science evidence, such as the 1966 Coleman Report, in arriving at desegregation decisions. He emphasizes that there should be a strict separation between redressing constitutional grievances and writing social science opinion into the law of the land:

> The evidence in my [1966] report is not relevant in any way to the question properly before the courts. The question is whether school systems have acted in a way that deprives students of their constitutional rights. That's a legal question, not a question of achievement levels. I think the courts were wrong to consider the report in any way. It's appropriate for school boards to consider such evidence but not courts. . . .
>
> Consider what would have happened if the report had said that segregated classrooms improved pupil performance. Would the courts have been justified in ordering bussing to create racial imbalance? Of course not. Courts are taking a very precarious path when they make research results about the achievement consequences of school integration a basis for reorganizing a school system. That's not their function, in my view.

Nor does it seem to be the view of many judges. Very few courts, somewhat contrary to Coleman's fears, have in fact rested their desegregation decisions on the findings of his report. That report, and its methodology, have been enormously controversial, spurring now almost a decade of academic debate. David Cohen and Michael Garet summarize the controversy in a recent article, "Reforming Educational Policy with Applied Social Research" in the *Harvard Educational Review*:

> The last decade, then, has seen a spectacular display of methodological fireworks about school effects. As a result, something more is now understood about how schooling affects achievement, income and other outcomes. Still more is understood about how to analyze these issues. But methodological sophistication has not in the least reduced substantive disagreement over the meaning of research results. Quite the contrary. It has refined technical issues, pressed them to higher levels and made at least some people more self-conscious about what the issues imply. This is an advance in knowledge. It is not, however, an advance which has produced any noticeable convergence, either in the sort of questions being asked, in the techniques with which answers are provided, or in the answers themselves.

Despite my disagreement with the result reached, perhaps Justice Lewis Powell was right, in his majority opinion in the *Rodriguez* case, not to rest the Supreme Court's decisions about the need for financial equalization of educational expenditures on the social science evidence presented in the briefs. With so many experts in disagreement, it would have been presumptuous for the Court, he felt, to attempt to wrest the "truth" from the contending academic factions and proclaim it as constitutional law.

James Coleman seems correct to me, at the present time, in emphasizing that desegregation decisions must continue to be made, quite apart from reports like his own. He seems also correct in his skepticism about expecting instant positive results from court-ordered bussing. The task before the courts, North and South, ever since *Brown v. Board of Education*, has been to bring about desegregation (which is preliminary to, and quite different from, integration). The emphasis is on the elimination of a stigma. The courts cannot afford to turn back from this task, particularly given the tentative and conflicted state of our social science knowledge. Coleman emphasizes that courts must continue to march forward and undo the discrimination which official action has brought about.

Very few civil rights advocates are surprised that test scores do not substantially improve, or racial attitudes markedly change, during an initial period of desegregation such as is now taking place in Boston. Indeed, given the level of violence and tension in schools like South Boston High and Hyde Park High, it would be a miracle if test scores did not go down and stereotyped attitudes did not become more fixed in these initial stages. The hope is not

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so much for the present. It is, after all, only the first step, albeit a step which must be made. The hope is that, perhaps twelve years from now, when the present turmoil has subsided, black and white kindergarten children and first-graders will begin to go to school together in peace and begin to learn to love and respect each other and to appreciate each other's diverse talents and contributions. Only then may those test scores start to improve. Yet, as Coleman rightly summarizes, given the box into which the *Rodriguez* and *Bradley* decisions have put federal district court judges, it seems illusory that much progress can be made toward achieving a truly integrated society until some way is found to attract the middle class—both white and black—back into our urban public schools. □

LATIN AMERICA

THE HOLE IN THE NEWS

RICHARD O'MARA

Rio de Janeiro

The Baltimore *Sun* will close its Latin American bureau at the end of June, after thirteen years in Brazil. The *Sun*, as most people in journalism know, is one of a small group of American newspapers that invest much money, talent and space in international news. (The others are *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, the *Los Angeles Times* and *The Christian Science Monitor*. *Time*, *Newsweek* and, to a lesser degree, *U.S. News & World Report* all cover Latin America more or less sporadically.) Its bureaus and correspondents span the globe, reporting to Baltimore from London, Paris, Bonn, Beirut, Moscow, New Delhi, Hong Kong, Tokyo, even California. Yet the *Sun* is withdrawing from Latin America. Why?

The main reason, according to the paper's management, is cost. Brazil is an expensive place to keep an office. Air fares in Latin America are rising; frequent travel is required of any correspondent in the region. Telex fees are increasing, even air mail costs more to send these days. But the same is true everywhere else, so why close down only in Latin America? The answer, simply stated, is that nobody cares about Latin America. That is true in Baltimore and everywhere else in the United States. As James Reston said a long time ago, Americans are willing to do anything for Latin America except read about it.

The *Sun* deserves much credit for having kept a bureau in this part of the world for so long, despite that implacable and enduring indifference. The underlying assumption behind its policy, evidently, was that news does not necessarily need a great number of eager readers to validate it as news. That, in fact, is the principle that guides all the best newspapers: the proposition that events, though distant and on the surface irrelevant to the life of the average American, should be recorded simply because they have occurred and have become part of man's history.

Few newspapers in the United States subscribe to this demanding philosophy. That is why most of them are so bad—uninformative, intellectually thin. Crossword puzzles, contests, comic strips, sports, advice columns—these are entertainments and newspaper owners understand that they are what most people want. But no newspaper can claim to be honest if it does not also present a generous portion of what most people do not want—the truth about the way of the world.

Yet even newspapers that meet the test find Latin America a hard case. (Australia and Africa may receive even less attention, but those places are much more distant and have not built up over the generations those cultural, economic and political associations that exist between Latin and Anglo-Saxon America.) The foreign editor of the *Sun*, Leo Coughlin, lamented once that the subject of Latin America turned off everyone he confronted with it. *The Nation*'s editor, Carey McWilliams, complained to me of how little playback in the form of letters from readers the magazine received after running a Latin American article. Yet both have continued to publish them. Apparently, Latin America must be addressed because, like Hillary's mountain, it is there.

But even the best motivated newspapers, those that try to offer their readers the broadest view of the world, are often victims of their own static ideas about out-of-the-way places. American journalism follows the flag; it reports most heavily on places where Americans have fought (Europe), have only recently left off fighting (Indochina), and might one day, conceivably, have to fight (the Middle East and the Soviet Union). That is understandable, perhaps proper, but the result is that the "safe" areas of the world (Canada and South America, to name two) forever remain in limbo.

This has a number of consequences. One is that rigid stereotypes develop. An aura of immutability falls over these forgotten regions, so that when significant changes do occur—the Cuban Revolution, the Brazilian economic surge—everyone is caught off guard. In such instances serious newspaper readers have a right to ask the editors, "Why didn't you signal us that this was coming?" Journalism's mission is, of course, to report what has occurred. But journalism, to be complete, should provide enlightened commentary, should suggest that, on the basis of this or that event, this or that development is highly likely—not inevitable, but probable.

A correspondent for a major American newspaper in Latin America once wrote his foreign editor to complain because a story he had written on the cocaine trade between Colombia and the United States had been put on the front page. It was an unexpected beef, since few correspondents are such strangers to the front page as those who report from Latin America. But the man wanted

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to make a point: an earlier story, of much greater long-range significance, had been run far back in the paper. His objection was to the mix-up of priority.

Cocaine is a dangerous drug and a challenge to drug-enforcement authorities in the United States. But cocaine abuse (unlike heroin abuse) is not a serious social problem in the United States, nor is the traffic in it likely to affect the way most Americans live. The story that ended up back near the comics was filed from Lima, Peru. It reported the first stirrings of what has become virtually a continent-wide movement among the Latin American nations: their attempts to form cartels and associations designed to stabilize at high levels the prices of their raw materials, and to link raw material prices to those of manufactures.

Secretary Henry Kissinger appreciates the danger this poses to the comfort of the average American citizen, his ability to consume, per capita, three times more of the world's nonrenewable resources than do the citizens of any other country. The Congress also understands the significance of that movement: it wrote the Trade Act, which punishes underdeveloped countries that try to put together cartels. Kissinger has warned the Latins against trying to regulate prices of raw materials. Led by the militant countries, Peru, Venezuela, Mexico at times, the Latins are going ahead anyway. Even Brazil, which some consider America's client in this region, is thinking of joining the Latin American Economic System (SELA), an agency proposed by Venezuela and Mexico. Its purpose is, specifically, to defend the prices of raw materials.

The spreading economic militancy in this part of the world almost assures that Latin America and the United States are entering a new era of conflict. That is the story of today and tomorrow in Latin America and its significance is much greater than the cocaine trade. It can be missed, however, by an editor who is constantly distracted by events elsewhere that carry more immediate and obvious significance.

The best editors and executives on American newspapers are aware that their inattention to Latin America sometimes causes them to miss the story; the worst often seem proud of their ignorance. Several years ago one of the latter, learning I was to be posted to Rio de Janeiro, remarked, "That's in Brazil, isn't it? I don't know anything about that place except there used to be that woman, what was her name? [Carmen Miranda] who used to dance around with fruit on her head." That kind of know-nothingism is upsetting, but ignorance in general is understandable. Latin America is just too big, too diverse, in a way too exotic, for anyone to understand it in its totality. The immensity of the intellectual challenge it poses can, by itself, put you off.

Brazil, for instance, is a country as big as the continental United States. In the north, the black African and Indian influence is strong; the south is European. Brazil has a unique and deep culture. Only the most arrogant journalist or scholar would pretend to know much of what it holds after a lifetime in the country. Argentina, where the dominant culture is Italian and the people speak Spanish, is as different from Portuguese-speaking Brazil as the United States is from Mexico. The Indian countries of the Andes, particularly Peru, Ecuador and Colombia, are

Liederman, Long Island Press

"I Can't See Anybody Right Now."

living museums of the pre-Columbian past, and at the same time are taking strides into the modern world. However, to learn something about them provides little insight into the tempestuous banana republics of Central America, and offers no great advantage in comprehending Mexico or the political and social orders that prevail on the island nations of the Caribbean.

Throughout Latin America four European tongues are spoken—Spanish, Portuguese, English and French—and three major Indian languages—Quechua, Aymara and Guarani. The governments are as varied: middle-road, one-party parliamentary systems (Mexico); viable multi-party democracies (Venezuela, Colombia); Socialist military dictatorships (Peru); right-wing military dictatorships committed to pure capitalism (Chile, Brazil), and so on. Most newspapers that care leave the presentation of that many-faceted picture to one, maybe two, at the most three correspondents. The space allotted them is invariably smaller than that given to news from any one major European country. It is not surprising, then, that operating under these handicaps, correspondents tend to seize upon the stereotypes themselves—torture stories from Brazil and Chile, beef stories from Argentina, "green hell" and Indian massacre stories from the Amazon—if only to attract their editors' attention.

True, the major news agencies—Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, etc.—maintain offices in all the prominent cities of Latin America. But the wire-service reports deal almost exclusively with the immediate event and often lack the perspective that a true understanding of the region demands. Sometimes the terse drama of wire-agency reports even distorts the picture. Agency stories, for instance, paint Argentina as a country on the edge of chaos, a dangerous place to live owing to the frequent kidnappings and political assassinations by terrorists of the Left and Right. Yet they rarely point out that that country's major city, Buenos Aires, is still a safer place to live in than, say, New York or Baltimore. Again, the fault is not so much that of the correspondent filing from Buenos Aires; stories on political murders are valid and, more often than not, will find a place in newspapers back home. Stories on the general peacefulness of Argentina's streets, every correspondent knows, are unlikely to show up in print anywhere.

With all this, North Americans probably under-

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stand Latin America better than do Europeans and Asians, who have large investments here. A friend of mine, a correspondent for a German newspaper, with more than ten years' experience in Latin America, recalls the reaction of his editor to a story he sent about the Peruvian military. That military establishment is thoroughly unusual for Latin America. During the past six and a half years it has systematically changed the entire economic structure of the country. It has implemented South America's most sweeping land reform, moved to restructure the industrial sector, to create a new Peruvian society. The Peruvian generals are the precursors of the radical officers now running Portugal. The German editor, however, had a mind-lock on his stereotype of Latin American generals, seeing them as watchdogs of the political and economic *status quo*. He could not accept the simple fact that things had changed in Peru, and returned his correspondent's copy crossed over with red pencil, the word "lies" scrawled at the top.

Then there was the experience of the correspondent for *Business International* who presided over a round-table discussion by a group of British businessmen. He listed the possibilities for profitable investment in a number of countries in Latin America, ending with Mexico. He then said to one of the discussion's participants, "Mexico is a comer. Why don't British investors look into the Mexican market?" An elderly Londoner snorted, "Mexico! Young man, we'll invest in Mexico when they stop having revolutions there." Mexico has had a stable government for almost fifty years. □

SOME TIPS FOR THE POSTMASTER

JONATHAN D. SARNA

Benjamin Franklin Bailar, the new and appropriately named Postmaster General, recently sent a flier to postal patrons which read "Help us give you better service by letting us hear from you. . . ." He is sure to receive thousands of complaints. Mail delivery is slow, costs are high and too many postal workers receive eight hours' pay for less than eight hours' work. Under the contract now being negotiated there is no hope for improvement: costs will rise, inefficiency and waste will continue. If there was ever a time for reform, the time is now. Suggestions for improvement, however, can come only from an understanding of how the system works and why it so often fails. The system, not its employees, is to be blamed for most postal ills.

The average letter gets sorted four times. First it goes into an area bag, corresponding to the first three digits in a zip code. Next it goes to the Post Office nearest to the addressee, which is identified by the last two digits of a zip code. Its third step is into a route slot for the distinct postal beat where the addressee's house is found. Finally, the letter is sorted into the pigeonhole that holds the mail for each individual house on a letter carrier's route. At about 8 A.M. every day (except Sunday) all the mail is bundled up, and made ready for delivery.



So far, so simple—though perhaps wasteful. Why then are so many letters delayed? The answer is that many letters are sorted at night, between the hours of 6 P.M. and 8 A.M., generally by tired clerks who often hold other jobs during the day. Even the morning postal crew is rarely at its best at 6 A.M. Consequently there are many mis-sorts, every one of which causes a delay of a day or two. A Boston letter put into a California bag probably loses three days. If it is later mis-sorted again, it can become one of those proverbial letters which take ten days to go ten blocks.

Sorting machines have so far proved of limited value. Most cannot actually read zip codes unless the printed address is in a particular spot in relation to the machine's scanner. Since American letters and packages don't have boxes printed on them for zip codes, the machines are blind. Perhaps we should imitate Japan and print zip code boxes in a stipulated spot on all envelopes. Of course, it would take years to get all envelopes standardized with zip codes in a given position. But by offering a penny discount on each letter which could be sorted by machine, the Post Office would certainly create a great incentive to buy new stationery.

For years, second- and third-class mail has been "bundled" geographically by the sender. Could something be done to cut down on the labor expended on first-class letters as well? Undoubtedly. All that is required is to adapt the corporate computers which now send out so much first-class mail to the task of pre-sorting. Any business which agreed to program its electronic brain with instructions for grouping together letters bound for the same zip codes, would receive a discount. If the computer could also break letters down into their respective postal

Jonathan Sarna, a student in the Yale Graduate School of History, worked during his summer vacations from Brandeis University at the Lynn and Newtonville (Mass.) Post Offices.

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routes (a more difficult feat which would require transferring the contents of postal route books into the computer's memory bank), an even bigger discount would be forthcoming. The principle is simple: he who saves the Post Office money gets to keep some of it for himself.

Unfortunately, the second major problem facing the Post Office cannot be solved by incentives or machines. There is no way within the present system to regulate the volume of mail so that a letter carrier would need the same amount of time to deliver mail on a warm Saturday in August and on a snowy Wednesday before Christmas. The five and a half hours assigned for delivery makes no sense except in winter; in summer, three to four hours is a better estimate.

Of course, no letter carrier will ever admit that it takes less than five and a half hours to walk his route. Unannounced inspections only embitter employees and waste the valuable time of highly paid officials. The only viable solution to this problem is to pay carriers by the job rather than by the hour. An additional way to save money would be to allow mail delivery to take place all day, instead of from 8:30 to 2, as at present. Ordinary mail carriers could then be invited to undertake second jobs, perhaps within the Post Office itself. College students could be recruited to carry mail, deliveries scheduled around their classes. Mothers could arrange to deliver mail while children were at school. Even the elderly might be usefully employed, since the full-day schedule would make the daily route into little more than a leisurely walk. To be sure, there would be inconveniences in a later mail delivery; recruitment of part-time help would also make postal management somewhat more complicated. Still, when one considers the reduced costs and the great social benefits which could ensue from a revised schedule of deliveries, the drawbacks seem slight.

The few schemes outlined here for improving the postal system could go a long way to speed mail delivery and decrease costs. None of the ideas requires futuristic technology or massive reorganization of postal facilities. None would cause widespread layoffs of current employees. The substitution of incentives and job contracting for subsidies and institutional inefficiency should go some way to solve the problems which have plagued the Postal Service for years. It would certainly be appropriate if in this Bicentennial year, Benjamin Franklin Bailar could return the Post Office to the place of glory it held after it was reorganized by his namesake 200 years ago. □

RADICALISM AS COMMON SENSE

THE OFFICE-HOLDING ACTIVISTS

JAMES ROWEN

Madison, Wis.

From June 13th through 15th, a gathering of local and state government officials, who came to be called the "programmatic Left," held a national meeting in Madison that was sponsored by the Washington, D.C. Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), with Madison's 30-year-old second-term Mayor, Paul R. Soglin, acting as host. Called the "National Conference on Alternative State and Local Public Policies," this historic meeting marked the first time that elected and appointed activists "who share a Populist or radical outlook," as described in the IPS letter of invitation, had convened to organize themselves into an action-oriented body. The more than 150 officials, among them mayors, judges, state legislators, City Council members, state and city department heads, school board members, consultants and many local commission, committee and board members, drawing on their proven abilities to win elections and hold public office, will probably influence the substance and direction of public policy for years to come.

The conference brought together "those who are working for the reconstruction of American society from below," according to IPS Co-Director Marcus Raskin, who attended the three-day meeting. In addition to such well-known figures as Colorado State Treasurer Sam Brown, D.C. School Board President Marion Berry, and U.S. Senate candidate Tom Hayden of California, workshop panelists arrived from twelve states, some traveling more than 2,000 miles at their own expense. The workshops were the heart of the conference. They were short on rhetoric, long on the nuts-and-bolts work of assembling and promoting specific, alternative public programs. The workshops followed a widely accepted determination among conference panelists and participants, best expressed by Sam Brown in the opening plenary session, to stay away from "code words" which have positive meaning only for those on the Left, and to concentrate instead on program.

The more than twenty workshops, held at the University of Wisconsin, covered the spectrum of basic social and economic issues that currently cry out for alternative solutions. Sessions on land-use planning, nutrition, comprehensive tax reform, public ownership of utilities and natural resources, police policy and the courts, employment and job creation, housing and cooperatives were among the topics discussed by panelists and other persons attending the conference.

The common theme tying these workshops together was the need to create forms of public ownership, control and management of vital resources, such as capital, fossil fuels, timber acreage and land. Jim Lorenz, director of California's Department of Employment Development, a cabinet-level agency in the Jerry Brown administration, put

James Rowen is the administrative assistant to the Mayor of Madison.

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it succinctly to the conference's opening session: "Control of capital is the issue. It is the right of every American to have a job with reasonable wages, and the right to organize."

The workshop panelists invited to the conference by IPS, and most of the persons attending the meeting, are committed to political change at the state and local level. This grass-roots emphasis represents a major shift for many persons who had previously been most concerned with national and international affairs during the anti-war movement. The conference sought to tap, organize and publicize the trend developing among activists toward involvement in local politics.

Concomitantly, a goal of the conference was to break down the feeling of isolation that afflicts progressives who have moved into positions of power at the state and local level. In Madison, for instance, we often wondered how like-minded people were handling issues in other cities, and sometimes whether there were any like-minded people "out there" at all. The conference helped answer questions of this kind by bringing together people from California, the District of Columbia, Maine, Vermont, Texas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, Massachusetts, West Virginia, Wisconsin—and the Province of British Columbia, in the person of Robert Williams, Minister of Natural Resources. Energy activists heard about public Utility Power Ownership in Nebraska, and a proposed Model State Energy Act in Maine; tax specialists discussed specific reform proposals being debated in Vermont; Sam Brown and others discussed the possibility of state-run banks and other publicly owned financial institutions, and two elected judges, Justin Ravitz from Detroit, and José Angel Gutierrez from Zavala County, Texas, related their experiences in attempting to humanize and reform the criminal justice system from the courtroom bench. Judge Gutierrez also best dealt with pragmatic strategies, and some of the conference participants' lingering doubts about the correctness of participating in electoral politics, when he stated that he and his supporters in La Raza Unida Party "utilize the electoral process as a means available to us."

A related goal of the conference was to exchange information, and this clearing-house activity was conducted on a massive scale. In addition to the communication at the workshops and plenary sessions, a conference reader, assembled by Derek Shearer, a journalist and consultant to the California State Department of Employment Development, was sold at cost to all conference participants. The reader, 2 inches thick and still available for $5 from IPS, contains interesting and innovative bills, ordinances, programs and articles, all written by members of this new generation of government activists. One of the conference's ongoing functions will be to compile and distribute an annual reader, as well as an IPS-inspired newsletter that will carry an index of progressive legislation, proposals and articles as they are published nationwide.

This exchange of information was designed to familiarize conferees with the technicalities of a variety of programs being proposed or implemented across the country. The emphasis therefore was on how to use power, not how to acquire it, since nearly all the conferees hold some kind of public office. Loni Hancock, a member of the Berkeley City Council, said her goal was "to turn the unthinkable into the inevitable," and "to shift the whole political spectrum of what is possible in Berkeley." Tom Hayden, who is trying to unseat U.S. Sen. John Tunney, remarked that his program was based on the belief that "the radicalism of the 1960s has become the common sense of the 1970s," summing up the widespread feeling at the conference and elsewhere that the Left's general analysis during the war in Vietnam had been proven right, and that proponents of that analysis could now shift their energies toward electoral politics.

Following the three days of workshops, several concrete steps were taken, based upon a series of recommendations by the conference organizer, Lee Webb, an economics professor at Goddard College, Plainview, Vt. The conference will continue with its primary orientation toward program development, also stressing the exchange of information. Four regional conferences are already being planned for the Midwest, Southwest, West and New England, and a 1976 conference may be held in Austin, Texas, at the invitation of that city's new independent Mayor Jeff Friedman, elected last April. The workshop areas will include: comprehensive tax reform; state and municipal bonding; women's issues; job creation and a redefinition of work, and public banks and finance. The continuing workshops will provide the substance for the regional conferences, the newsletter, the annual reader and next year's conference. Again, program is the major focus of the work of the conference.

And for those of us who have attended innumerable conferences and meetings, so many of them shattered by bickering or factional infighting, the Madison conference itself was a pleasurable alternative. An unmistakable air of confidence, and a feeling of *élan* permeated the formal sessions, the workshops, the hallway caucuses, and the gatherings late at night in Madison's student beer bars. Ling Yee Kelley, a member of the Berkeley City Council, told the conference that she had not experienced such a positive feeling among a group of people since her work in the California McGovern delegation in 1972. Many panelists, including Madison's Mayor Soglin, said they left the conference with a strange experience not common to national conventions—they felt they had actually learned something. The only complaint I heard during the three days of meetings was that the two hours given to each workshop were not enough; many sessions were continued into a second day. One reconvened at 8 on Sunday morning.

The short-term benefits of the Madison conference were obvious. Whether or not the National Conference on Alternative State and Local Public Policies evolves into something more formal, such as a lobby or a third party, is unknown. Professor Webb told the conference in his concluding remarks that he considered the conference "not a movement, but a social phenomenon"—a gathering of activists finding themselves at the same place in government at the same historical point. And when a questioner asked who would control the conference, Webb gave the same kind of programmatic answer that typified the entire Madison meeting: "the future of the conference will be determined by the people who work the hardest." □

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

The Right to Your Own Culture

POPULAR CULTURE AND HIGH CULTURE. *By Herbert J. Gans. Basic Books. 179 pp. $10.*

JOSEPH CUNNEEN

"All people have the right to the culture they prefer," Herbert Gans asserts in his provocative new book, "regardless of whether it is high or popular." His sharp attack on the snobbery of self-appointed cultural experts deserves a wide hearing but his subject is too large and complex to be reduced to the sociological generalizations in which he has cast it.

Gans makes the mistake of restricting his discussion almost entirely to the mass media, and offers no close analysis of specific cultural objects and their probable effects on audiences. He should be applauded, however, for his plea for a wider range of choice; his major policy recommendation is for what he calls "cultural subprogramming"—material aimed at the poor, the elderly, blacks, Chicanos and other "publics" who are neglected by mass-media fare.

Gans denies that popular culture is something created by a small profit-seeking elite who "can impose almost anything they think will sell on the American public," since "it is shaped by that audience, at least in part, albeit indirectly." His position might be even stronger if he pointed out that the passivity ascribed to the popular culture audience seems equally present among those rushing to a Lincoln Center Film Festival. *Nation* readers (and reviewers) would do well to wince at Gans's treatment of culture as largely an index of education and income, and be humble enough to recognize that we hanker after novelty and sensationalism (though in sophisticated forms) as much as any devotee of TV soap opera. But we might then wonder if Gans hasn't left out the questions of value and purpose, in the absence of which culture is merely a random collection of data.

In answering the charge that popular culture encourages violence and excessive fantasy, Gans adopts the strategy of the defense lawyer. Whatever the actual behavior of his client, he seems to say, there are no witnesses—that is, no reliably empirical studies—that can establish "guilt" by building a closely reasoned cause-and-effect argument. He strangely undermines his position at the outset, however, with the admission that he is "inclined to think that popular culture, or at least that part of it transmitted by the mass media, tends to go in one eye and out the other, and that most individual television programs, movies and magazines are ephemeral for most people." There are, of course, highbrow modes of comparable culture consumption; the question is: how do we foster a culture (both popular and high) in which there is a significant participation by the public? And why shouldn't more of us be creators of that culture, giving expression to it in our games, our celebrations, in the way we work and eat and dress and love?

Although he ultimately concedes that "the higher cultures are better or at least more comprehensive than the lower ones," Gans is consistent in maintaining that "if . . . [the] cultural choices [of various persons] express their own values and taste standards, they are equally valid and desirable whether the culture is high or low." Since he places the burden of proof on those doomsday critics of popular culture who believe that it harms its audience, he feels able to assert, with considerable sociological conviction, that the evidence available from existing studies does not support such an interpretation, and even a reader who might like to know more about such studies—how were they conducted, and what were their limited results?—will be apt to agree.

Gans resents the efforts, both conscious and unconscious, of the high-culture elite to universalize its values, but in treating various "taste publics" simply in terms of class differences he is hopelessly flattening out his own emphasis on significant cultural choice. He himself cautions the reader that different members of an audience will make individual evaluations of the same film or TV program; how can he expect to avoid the rarified atmosphere of aesthetic and/or moral judgment when his policy of cultural programming "is intended to give people *what they judge to be good rather than what they want*"?

The author is on the side of justice and good sense in advocating a wider range of alternatives and in suggesting that it is the so-called "lowbrows" who are neglected by the media and not given adequate means of public expression of their standards and tastes. It seems, however, that he has too high a respect for formal education and underestimates the way in which normally imaginative and inquisitive children are bombarded with deadening images and associations from both the media and their school experience from a very early age. It is easy to ridicule the overly precious English instructor who insists on assigning Henry James's *The Ambassadors* to his freshman class at a public university whose clientele is largely composed of graduates of inner-city high schools, but Gans's populism does not go far enough: our children deserve to see the most beautiful pictures and to hear the most profound stories, and there is no reason to believe that they begin school with less taste than museum directors or makers of *avant-garde* films.

Taste of course needs to be trained, and besides, we can never be sure what the results of a given cultural training will be. The history of Nazi Germany should have taught us that men and women could enjoy listening to Beethoven (not just Wagner), collecting wildflowers and reading "the classics"—and still have murder in their hearts. Unless we are to be satisfied with the notion that listening to a symphony is a good thing to do, we will need to look more closely at what kind of emotional dress rehearsal is involved in our recreational pursuits and how they might be helped to connect with human values that are not tied to class or race or ideology. Reading Gans's book should be a usefully humbling experience for those who care deeply about many of the products of traditional high culture and yet wish to transcend an outmoded cultural imperialism. But as we reflect on how the values we cherish might find alternate forms of expression in new cultures still straining for maturity, we should keep in mind what Gans seems to forget: the degree to which cultural education—largely mis-education—is constantly going on, and the limited degree to which any of us, not simply those with less formal education and income, are making significant cultural choices.

Since there no longer is a generally

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accepted high culture which society wishes to pass on to its young, we have to start with the hardest, most basic questions: What stories do we want to tell our children? What games should they learn? What songs should they sing? And how can we make it more likely that these experiences will make them freer, wiser, better children? Those arguing over new curricula and alternative media could make good use of a paperback edition of Gans's book in carrying on this needed discussion. I hope such an edition will be made available. □

More Cussed Than Discussed

THE CASE AGAINST COLLEGE. *By Caroline Bird. David McKay Co. 308 pp. $9.95.*

THE PROFESSORS: Who They Are, What They Do, What They Really Want and What They Need. *By Herbert Livesey. Charterhouse Books. 343 pp. $9.95.*

BARBARA DAMROSCH

Caroline Bird, according to the blurb on the jacket of her book, "has an uncanny knack for spotting trends in our society far ahead of the crowd." The "crowd" may indeed still subscribe to the "national myth that every 18-to-22-year-old American should go to college," but it requires no ESP to see flaws in that myth. Paul Goodman, ten years ago, maintained that college as he knew it was no more than a stage in a system of "compulsory miseducation," and riots on campuses since then have shown, among other things, that something is wrong with the college experience.

What *is* wrong with it? The argument that will sell Ms. Bird's book (though not her only argument) is that college isn't worth the money any more. Given recent job shortages, especially in the very fields that students newly greened by the counter-culture want to enter, such as forestry, oceanography and urban planning, college doesn't guarantee you a good living. Since college-aged people are not needed economically, they are stuck in these "youth ghettos" where they feel infantilized and unproductive. They are being driven to anomie, suicide, and the need to choose their own alternative solutions. "Sweeping changes will be needed" to provide them with sensible ones, says Bird, and she proposes several herself, including on-the-job vocational training and a system under which a liberal education might be offered to anyone who wants it, at whatever point in life.

Bird has written a well-researched survey of the facts that raises some good questions about college. But as an attempt at sorting out the problem it only confuses the reader, subjecting the institution of higher education to a variety of attacks without any thoroughgoing social analysis. The confusion stems from the relationship between two opposing views of what college is supposed to do. Both these views are popular ones.

The first, the rosy view, is that college is a banquet of the gods, where beauty is truth and truth beauty, and where a young person is made wiser, more humane and more tolerant. Bird ascribes this view to the "liberal arts religion" for which she can find no adequate definition beyond this one: college should teach "the habit of logical analysis and the conventions of rhetoric that make it possible to resolve differences of view on human affairs by debate and discussion." She must have asked the wrong people, for a good deal has been said and written on this subject. College may be the place for discussion, but this discussion is translatable into action (which a "resolution" might or might not be), and action is worthless if all the lessons of history must be relearned with each new generation. Even when it fails to instill values, a broad education gives people a belief in the possibility of choice. Bird pays this kind of education a series of backhanded compliments. Liberal arts graduates, she concedes, are more intelligent, more liberal than other people, but they were that way to start with and went to college for that reason. College encourages a high expectation of "psychic income" from a vocation, an expectation that is doomed to be unsatisfied, since few such pleasant jobs exist and only the job of college professor will fulfill it completely.

The second view of college, the practical one, is that it is a great Thanksgiving dinner from which people emerge successful, well-fed and middle class. But here again, says Bird, the prospects are gloomy. If the frost is on the rose, then the bloom is also off the pumpkin. If college provides entry into the elite, then college-for-everyone won't work. If college gives you the tools of management—certain kinds of discourse, the ability to manipulate abstract symbols—it must be for the few, since society can only use so many managers. The liberal arts religion is simply the mystery of class, the life of total fringe benefit, "instant operational prestige with strangers, the words and accents that make traffic cops believe your side of the story." Even professional training is a fraud, she claims, designed to corner the market for the pros. Skills such as

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ESTONIAN POEMS BY IVAR IVASK
(Translated by the author and Astrid Ivask)

FIRE

With a thousand faces fire peers into darkness
but sees nothing more than its own burning,
sees neither you nor the bleak snow.
Soon the ferns tire of waiting.
Light is not fire but another kingdom.
Blasts of tenderness, clearness
In the raging fire.
Yet out of fire were you made,
to fire shall you return:
to fire to fire to fire.

TWILIGHT

The solemn rite of twilight
takes place around our tired house:
the pinetree crosses itself,
the roof-gable folds its hands,
the moon opens her eye in another world.

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general surgery could be picked up just as successfully by hanging around a hospital and watching the doctors at work.

I think that the split between the two goals is not a natural one, but one fostered by a distressed society: if college succeeds in its utopian aim it makes students unfit for the practical world. It produces "the Graduate" who comes home to L.A. and says "no" to plastics. The fact that both utopian and practical goals have existed simultaneously is one of the ironies of our culture. As political currents shift back and forth, college is the medium through which the middle class alternately replenishes and destroys itself. During the war in Vietnam the utopian element was of great social value to us. Do we no longer need it now that the war is over? Such trendiness is dangerous. If we pay attention to it, we lose our sense of history—even recent history.

I think that college does have something to offer the unintellectual or poorly prepared students, even if they must return to a proletarian job after graduation. If college raises expectations of psychic income, perhaps graduates will apply those standards to their working conditions, their leisure hours, the life of their communities and the way their society is governed. Between the people on the bottom (entering students) and the people on top (trustees, regents) there is often an agreement that college is a track that leads to money. But in the classroom, theoretically, anything can happen. And sometimes remarkable things do.

Which leads us to a book about professors. Herbert Livesey's argument starts out as something like a postscript to Caroline Bird's. Though his title is less polemical, he tells us right away that the professor is "the most pampered professional in our society." He is "underworked and overpaid," though he is apt to claim just the opposite is true. Mr. Livesey quotes the same HEW statistics that Bird does, to show that "93 per cent of all urban professors would opt for their present careers." This shows that professors are, in all the country, the people most contented in their work. Surely there must be something fishy about that state of affairs—with everyone else so miserable.

The bulk of *The Professors* is a series of interviews with some eighteen college teachers, including two presidents and three adjuncts. Most of them are, indeed, happy in their work, but that's about all you can say by way of generalization. They represent a diverse group of people whose emphases in their work range widely. Some are committed to teaching, some to research, and their professional activities range from playwriting to archaeological excavation. They represent the "best" of the profession, Livesey tells us, and include some familiar names, such as S.I. Hayakawa and Martin Duberman. The author's own observations on the state of college teaching run through the interviews, but these are, by and large, personality sketches, and we are sometimes halfway through one before we find out where the person interviewed teaches.

At one point Livesey says of professors' physical appearance, "Professors in the mass look amazingly alike." Disappointingly, he reverts to this mass-eye view at the end of the book. Professors, above all, are "arrogant," he says, sounding like the person who claims, "Doctors in the mass are scoundrels but *my* physician is excellent." Most professors have poor professional ethics, he says, even some of those profiled in his book (the accusation remains this vague) and are thus responsible for a host of ills: "Bribe-paying and price-fixing corporations are run by college graduates who were taught by college professors. Lying lawyers, fee-splitting physicians, scheming politicians, and murderous military leaders were taught by professors and frequently advised by them after graduation." One wonders how Attila the Hun, lacking even a B.A., got as far as he did. True, some professors do war research, but there must be a distinction between what professors actually urge and what they have been unable to prevent.

Some of Livesey's suggestions for improving the professoriate are good. There should be more rewards for good teaching. Colleges and universities should "stop propagating doctoral programs simply to assuage ambitious or egocentric faculty members" (though I would guess there is as much pressure from professions outside the university). Hiring by the "old boy" system, and the domination of the profession by white males, ought to stop (though I wonder why Livesey's own collection of eighteen profiles of the "best" includes only one woman, and a teaching assistant at that). He suggests, rightly, that the current trend toward unionization may result in less power for the faculty, which would lose what is left of its traditional "par-

MAN ACROSS THE STREET

All of your neighbors were wearing gray felt hats.
You went out and bought a gray felt hat.
I remember your eyes like the sea
the color of no color.

The sea also is lonely
taking into its bed
bottles, love letters, shoes.
How it loves feeling over and over
whatever hands have touched.

The sea pleads with the land
it says hold me, hold me.
You ache to be included
in subways, the dark theater

and like a tide
you comfort yourself with boredom:
look at your room
the swept floor, the bare table.

And yet the sea can rage.
It knows what it wants
its treasure, its gold daughter.
You have forgotten
what long ago you left
in a drawer in a room somewhere.

Listen to the waves, how they keep crying
grief, grief.
All night you lie awake and try to remember.

Katha Pollitt

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ticipatory function." In other words, the faculty may not be a pampered elite much longer anyway.

Much more to the point is the increasing domination of colleges and universities (along with government and most of our institutions) by the power of large businesses. No one has ever come up with a perfect formula for making universities responsive to the needs of society and involved in its problems without being so involved that they merely serve the powers that be. Professorial arrogance is not, however, the problem. If teachers were less timid about demanding a free atmosphere for learning and worked to subvert the elitist tendencies of higher education it would help. It also makes sense for both students and professors to drop out periodically and take a more active role as citizens, while keeping the colleges as free from commercial interests as possible.

But to suggest that college is a waste of time and professors are effete snobs just feeds the worst prejudices of the public—that college will make the boys effeminate and give the girls funny ideas. The old naive faith in college is still good for something and if we kill it in the name of a facile populism we might have some trouble bringing it back. Next year, when we are reading *The New Professors* and *What College Can Do for You*, it might not be there at all. □

The Puritan Heritage Examined

PURITANISM IN AMERICA: New Culture in a New World. *By Larzer Ziff. The Viking Press. 338 pp. $10.*

MELVIN H. BUXBAUM

Larzer Ziff is one of the foremost historians of American culture, his efforts ranging in scope from early 17th-century New England Puritanism to the beginning of the 20th century. The present book is perhaps his most ambitious undertaking, for he attempts nothing less than a synthesis of "the special concerns of intellectual, social, and economic history into a single account of the American Puritans." Moreover, Ziff offers suggestions on how Puritan perceptions of reality and responses to that reality in the New World—what he calls Puritan "culture"—have affected subsequent American life and character. In concerning himself with that culture, he has very sensibly avoided treating ideas as if they enjoyed lives independent of daily experience, rooting them instead in material contexts.

Ziff, then, is here continuing his struggle against the methods and conclusions of those historians of early American life, men like Perry Miller and his followers, who tend to divorce ideas from concrete experience in an effort to focus attention on Puritan intellect. This approach, Ziff has long felt, is deficient. While it doubtless indulges the fantasies of those who would make the Puritans intellectuals and, on the whole, very positive influences on the national character, it does violence to truth and blinds us to the origin of problems which still plague us. *Puritanism in America* is intended to offer a more valid way of seeing the link between the Puritans and ourselves.

The printed word had a profound effect on Puritan culture, and Ziff relates its impact to two contrary views of grace and nature and to the sense of masterlessness large numbers of Englishmen felt as the old feudal order began to crumble. The word not only brought Puritans victory over Anglicans but it promised them eventual triumph over the forces of Satan. The large conflicts of history, while they were important, would not affect the outcome of the struggle. God's servants were foreordained to inherit the fruits of victory on earth as in heaven. Thus, church hierarchies and authority were at best irrelevant to the faithful, who were subject only to the dictates of their converted consciences. They knew, however, that their conduct was scrutinized and that they were expected to be diligent in their calling and faithful to their creditors. They had to be men who were good credit risks and worthy of power in the state. Unregenerate men, on the other hand, could not be trusted with either money or power. This was the "new perception" of reality that the Puritans brought to America and adapted to wilderness conditions.

Once in the New World, they were faced with challenges they had to address as a culture. Freed from the restraints of the Anglican hierarchy, they turned to the family to provide the new structure that would insure unity of belief. The promoters of immigration therefore exhibited their customary zeal in undertaking to populate the wilderness with saints, arguing that America was a land in which one could accumulate material as well as spiritual wealth. It was not expected that Christian liberty would breed confusion, but this is what happened as early as 1637. In discussing the threat posed by Anne Hutchinson and other Antinomians, people who identified grace with extreme secular liberty, Ziff offers important insights into the relationship between sincere conversion and wealth. The Antinomians believed that the converted could not properly be constrained by human institutions or by commercial checks. It is also true that these saints came from among the wealthiest Puritans in New England. That attitude prevailed long after the 17th century. As Ziff points out, New England Transcendentalism, which had profound connections with the mystical side of Puritanism so appealing to the Antinomians, developed in the context of *laissez-faire* capitalism. But this was to take place in the 19th century, long after Anne Hutchinson and a number of her followers were banished in order to preserve the culture.

Since the voluntary fellowship that led to commonwealth was central to the community, all who upset the Puritan structure had to be treated severely. There were too many dangers

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DANNIE'S GROVE

Because he died just after he put them in,
trailing his eighteenth year like a broken branch,
we call these trees he planted "Dannie's Grove."
The birds all love to wander or nest or hover here,
the crippled Canada goose and his friend the mallard,
and a thousand comely civilians—robin, junco, cardinal, dove—
and wind-borne migrants pausing early and late
on the still-slender maples and tulips, budding again.
Dannie Murphy planted them here a year ago.
He said he'd replace the ones that didn't leaf and grow,
but all are doing fine again this spring.

M.L. Rosenthal

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It makes every GM car a real performer.



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—enabled engineers to improve fuel economy in city driving by 28% over 1974 model GM cars on a sales-weighted average, according to EPA calculations,

—reduces exhaust emissions of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide by about 50% from already lowered 1974 levels,

—lasts the lifetime of the car with unleaded fuel and proper engine maintenance,

—in normal operation its outside skin temperature is about the same as an ordinary muffler and far lower than the temperature of an exhaust manifold,

—has low sulfate emissions, caused by incompletely refined fuel, no higher than those of a diesel engine of similar size.

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in the wilderness for the settlers to be genteel or even, as Ziff claims, humane. Roger Williams tried to protect saints from sinners by insisting on the right to dissent from the establishment's view on theology and church organization. He further demanded that language be freed from religious constraints and be permitted to work in behalf of secular interests. The authorities, however, believing that religious life and expression encompassed all other concerns, banished Williams. Of course, the Indians posed the greatest threat to stability and consequently gave rise to the policy of genocide. Puritans, convinced they were the central actors in the dramatic battle between the armies of God and Satan, had little trouble accepting and enforcing the policy of repression.

Still, the drive for toleration grew. The development of commerce brought about a large class of prominent merchants who, if they were less pious than their fathers, were still decent Christians. These men were denied their full civil rights because they could not be certain enough of their church experience to become full church members. The merchants, angry at their inferior status, aligned themselves with the forces of change in New England. Interestingly, their opponents were from the agriculturally oriented establishment, and economics once again became part of an ostensibly theological issue. The ascendancy of William and Mary eventually brought toleration, but during the intervening years the New England authorities granted concessions only grudgingly. Of course, some meaningful accommodation was necessary, for the culture felt itself justified by the authority of God to initiate with impersonality the most cruel attacks on its opponents.

In time, compromise changed the culture radically and also helped it survive for a century and have important consequences even after its decline. It endured because it offered its adherents a satisfying way of seeing themselves and the world. They perceived themselves as called and chosen by God to create a City on a Hill in New England. While aware that they were part of the British Empire, they felt that their culture was independent and different from that at "home." As long as they followed in the paths carved out for them by the founders, they had every reason to expect continued success. Experience in America proved that Puritanism worked well—at least for reasonably acceptable Puritans.

As religion became less important than secular life, though, Puritanism changed. The fathers were reduced to models of an idealized and sentimentalized past that could never be recaptured and that few actually sought to recapture. The literary forms that once conveyed deep religious experience became mere vehicles of fashion and expressions of refined sensibilities. The ministers, who produced most of the literature, degenerated. Once physicians of the soul, they became men who tried to create art and to show that they were superior to the common people. As families grew less pious and orthodox, morality became the responsibility of the officials. The community was becoming fragmented along professional lines. Ministers, a distinct class by the third quarter of the 17th century, were expected to bewail the decline of piety in formulaic jeremiads. The verbal lashings were good for the conscience and had the virtue of being basically irrelevant to everyday life. Without a unique mission, the City on a Hill was becoming a backwater of the Empire. Once Puritans learned to live with toleration, they were well on their way to true provinciality.

With the decline in zeal, growing provincialism and sentimentality came a deterioration in standards of excellence. Whereas the first members of the clergy were men of learning as well as of piety and orthodoxy, many of their descendants were often either rustics or town-bred liberals. When Cotton Mather and his supporters tried to re-establish the authority of the most orthodox and learned clergy, they were opposed from within their ranks by the Rev. Mr. John Wise. He had learned to live with and respect the increasingly secularized, assertive and democratic populace, and in his attack on Mather, the *Vindication of the Government of New England Churches,* he revealed how much Puritanism had changed by 1717, the year it was published. Inspired by the eminent jurist Pufendorf, Wise audaciously dismissed all considerations of original sin and defended Congregationalism on the ground that it insured the rights and happiness of the people! The churches, then, were only partners in a social contract. Wise's chief influence was to come during the time of the Revolution, long after his death. Yet his *Vindication* proves that the culture which was able to survive because it included disparate elements and adjusted to significant changes, was nevertheless becoming divided.

This division was most pronounced in the lives and writings of Jonathan Edwards and Benjamin Franklin, who are often seen as two poles of American character: the intensely religious and the secular. The same culture gave rise to both men, and the views they represent have played important roles in establishing the quality of life in America. Both traditions—that of high seriousness and that of worldly practicality—are incorporated into American culture and interact, but their distinctness is nonetheless real. The followers of Edwards inherited a belief that self-reform is superior to institutional reform, and American artists and intellectuals have largely criticized the United States by exploring and criticizing the national mind. The descendants of Franklin expressed the belief that the mission of the City on a Hill had to be realized in secular terms, and that the blessings of God were to be embodied in democratic institutions, free trade and material prosperity. In more recent times this view has made it our national duty to spread the blessings of democracy throughout the world, just as the Puritans spread the Gospel. We are like them too at times in our ruthlessness and self-righteousness toward all who disagree with us. And like them, we are ready to be generous to those who accept the superiority of our way. Puritan culture, then, has survived Puritan theology and provincialism.

That has been Ziff's argument and method. He has tried to shift the focus on the Puritan past from intellect to the daily responses to life in a wilderness made by a community that did not allow itself to become a slave to ideas and beliefs, no matter how desirable those were.

So large an undertaking as Ziff's can hardly be without flaws. His chief difficulty is that he does not make enough use of major recent studies of Puritanism. Some of these probably have little appeal to his sensibilities, which are literary and more concerned with broad ideas. Yet he errs in ignoring the work of such scholars as Morgan, Bercovitch, Demos, Lockridge and Foster, for they could have provided him with keener insights into Puritan social structure, belief and character. Many neglected works would have helped Ziff ground Puritanism more certainly to the concrete realities he seeks. In fact, Ziff makes use of only two works published in 1970 or later: one in 1970 (a part of his own work in an anthology), and the other in 1971 (a study of the Mathers by Ziff's former colleague, Robert Middlekauff). One does not have to cite recent books just because they are recent, to be sure; however, Ziff might, for example, have modified his views of the Puritan family, Puritan acceptance of cruelty toward opponents, slavery in New England and the appeal of revivalism had he expanded

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his use of the scholarship in the field. Nor does Ziff always use the most authoritative texts available. To cite one instance, it is strange that he ignores the Yale-American Philosophical Society edition of Franklin's *Autobiography* and uses instead an earlier, more casual one. Finally, there is the matter of style. Ziff's writing is normally graceful, and in places it is here, too. Yet too often his style reflects the complexities and struggles he encountered in his difficult task, and there are many sentences that are quite unclear.

Yet few scholars have so successfully made Puritan experience concrete. Ziff moves very skillfully among various levels of economic, political, intellectual and social structure in Puritan America, showing where those elements intermeshed, where they were fundamentally discrete, where and why tensions developed, and how accommodations were made. Furthermore, no one has dealt so brilliantly with the linguistic side of Puritanism. The insights into the Puritan use of language are truly impressive and useful. In sum, this is a flawed but most valuable study. It is not the only book one should read on the subject, but it is one that persons interested in understanding the American past, and a fair amount about this nation's present mentality, will find indispensable. □

Fire Burn and Cauldron Bubble

DOUBLE, DOUBLE. *By José Yglesias. The Viking Press: 244 pp. $6.95.*

ANN McADAMS

There are two main characters in this novel, the seventh book of José Yglesias: Seth Evergood, a 36-year-old "chic" radical, lecturer on college campuses, author of *Paris Spring: 1968*, and the 28-year-old Gary Epstein, radical organizer and intellectual ("I got my Ph.D. at twenty-one and made my folks very happy")—both out to overturn everything Establishment, including the parental values that had made Gary place intellectualizing above "gut reaction." The two work together on a revolutionary committee of which Gary is secretary. Gary wears a red Afro (but he is Jewish), is something of a prodigy, having run an important errand to Cuba for the committee after the Bay of Pigs, when he was 21. His office in New York is full of autographed photos: Ben Bella, Nkrumah, Chou En-lai.

Seth and Gary go on a mission to "pick up some stuff" (drugs) in Vermont. Seth is to visit his mother in Connecticut first; he has been asked to write a book about his father, James Evergood, a journalist who had known Scott Fitzgerald, Hemingway (who "envied him his knowledge of the bullfights") and Mencken ("even Mencken liked him"). His mother will supply him with reminiscences and papers. She remembers "lunch at the White House with Eleanor." Seth himself is reminded of toddling (on a leash, one of those terrible contraptions to harness small children) into a Paris café with his father: Malraux arrived later with word of an uprising in Madrid, and Seth's father, announcing he would leave for the action at once, turned Seth in his tether over to Sartre, *Sartre*, with instructions to return him to his mother.

Already, we have watched Seth worry about losing "a gold pen from Tiffany's" a memento "Sara and Gerald Murphy had given his father before he became political and went off to Spain." Seth's great-great-grandfather "was in Lane Theological Seminary with Lyman Beecher and Harriet and Calvin Stowe." A letter, floating around in the family for years, had been signed by Walt Whitman.

For all his revolutionary "connections," Gary is dumbfounded to learn of all this. "In my family we can't even boast of an illegitimate child sired by Jacob Adler," he gasps. Yet all is not glamorous in Seth's family's past, as Seth discovers upon reading entries in his father's journal that intimate James Evergood gave information under coercion to the FBI concerning revolutionary connections. The discovery is part of a journey toward self-discovery. In Vermont, Seth journeys further, finding what the blurb on the jacket of *Double, Double* calls "total sexual liberation" in an orgy at a Vermont commune. Sexual overtones earlier in the novel hinted at in the relationship between the two men, brought out in descriptions of a performance of sex improvisations they witness, and in which Gary participates ("audience participation"), at the Fillmore East, explode finally in this pastoral setting. The revolutionary Seth finds himself revolutionized—at least, he is now aware of the richness of the possibilities that lie within him, but this is not heartening to Seth, it is frightening or disgusting. "He thought: it was not love, I am a fool, it was not love, I am a fool." It was *not* love, and he certainly seems justified in feeling a fool. Mr. Yglesias presents the orgy in detail but gracelessly, as a catalogue of acts, and the presentation creates little excitement or even "sensuous feeling," no love.

Mr. Yglesias' title is sufficiently ambiguous (and this is not a criticism) to make its meaning hard to determine. Perhaps he means to point up the way opposite principles are so often joined, since it is a fact that they are joined blatantly in this novel. The principle with which *Double, Double* is most concerned appears to be "freedom," for which sexual liberation may be a symbol; but sexual liberation is linked to guilt or nagging disillusionment, conditions that "enslave" the mind. Seth is dependent all along upon pills, and this

Ann McAdams, formerly a writer for The National Observer, *comments frequently on fiction. She lives in Raleigh, N.C.*

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FALL

October. A windy week
since rain. Termites
in locust hordes attack
the house. Their wings
have sprung, brown
as winter water, huge
thin-veined membranes
that carry them and fold
and slip through any crack.
Why do they fly against
us, wait for night,
this night? Yesterday
I saw the whole farm
fail. The wind load
took the barn. I had
to kill the cow
caught there and torn
by broken boards.
A fog-blown day of hide
brown, board gray,
blood red. And now
the slow stain and crawl
of these transparent wings.
This afternoon I walked
through alders clear to where
our last maple stands,
moss-hung. Its leaves,
yellow, large and dry,
came down, one by one
by one, crashing.

Anthony Ostroff

dependency is not broken after his sexual liberation; near the end of the novel, he feels panic when he is unable to find his pills ("He thought: I'm an addict"). At the same time, marijuana has been used in the orgy to relax qualms or inhibitions, effect the sexual liberation, so that drugs have two meanings for Seth, freedom and its "negative double," enslavement or dependency.

There are some fine scenes in *Double, Double*. One in particular I liked: Seth meets his future editor for the biography of his father at La Gravure, "this year's literary restaurant," is nervous, immediately introduces the question of the biography, then worries that he has brought it up too soon, gets up to make a phone call and, crossing the restaurant, thinks he sees Philip Roth, which pleases and bothers him—*is* it Philip Roth? Apparently, all the glittering names in his family background have not inured him to this sort of excitement, and his emotional scuttling around is pathetic, funny and true. Another good restaurant scene (in a Jewish dairy restaurant) has Seth and Gary exchanging banter over eggplant steak with a Jewish waiter. The quality of the talk makes the incident seem almost quaint, especially because of the general context, which is violently *modern*, fraught with violent, shocking revelations. Gary comes to realize, early in the novel, that his girlfriend, Trudy, is sleeping with another man, a revelation that stuns him. He reacts immediately by cutting off his Afro. As for Seth, there are of course the revelations about his father that are part of his own self-discovery. The most devastating shock arrives on the last page, in the last paragraph. It is a development prepared by the escalation of lesser shocks, a raising or "doubling" of stakes or risks (which is perhaps after all what Mr. Yglesias means by his title), and yet a development which is entirely unforeseen itself, jarring and violent. □

FILMS

ROBERT HATCH

It is a temptation, with Robert Altman's *Nashville*, to run out the bunting, summon the trumpets and let the adjectives rip. For, above all, the film is a stupendous (there I go) entertainment. Don't suppose that you can sit there and sneer at those country-and-Western performers belting out, or whimpering, their songs. They are pros, and they understand how the blood pumps. *Nashville* is boisterous, good-natured, funny, exciting and brutal; it will exhaust you and you will feel rewarded.

All this, need I say, did not happen by accident. *Nashville* is the canniest product yet of a very canny director. In the first place, it was a brilliant notion to use Nashville, the capital of Middle America's music, as the scene for a melodramatic operetta on the theme of the country's disarray. "Nashville is a city of instant success," Altman said in a recent interview with Paul Gardner of *The New York Times*. "It's the Hollywood of forty years ago." And like that Hollywood, it both caters to the widest possible audience and shapes that audience to the visions and aspirations expressed in its product. The tone of Nashville is nostalgia, bully patriotism, "come to Jesus" religion, callow love and vicious sentimentality.

Altman has built his film on the most hazardous of frameworks, the sustained mass extravaganza, and he succeeds by weaving his dozen or more principal characters through the rushing crowd in a perfectly timed counterpoint of overlapping narratives. (The screenplay, by Joan Tewksbury, is perfectly disciplined chaos.) No one gets lost in the melée and Altman makes his points by tapping you once and then coming back with a crusher. That raddled former beauty, sobbing her love for the dead Kennedys, establishes her own form of defeat, but her monologue is there for another reason as well. And if you think that only a yahoo audience in funny hats would jeer a sick star off the stage, wait and see what Nashville's business elite can do to a girl of no talent at all.

To use crude labels, country-and-Western is right-wing music, as folk music is left wing, and through the scenes of the picture there moves a sound truck, blatting the cheery totalitarian gospel of a would-be Presidential candidate. Also moving quietly through situation after situation is his advance man, setting up the talent of Nashville for a monster songfest and rally at which his man is to reveal himself to the voters of Tennessee. Michael Murphy plays this cool joker, handsome, relaxed, plausible and turning the surprising trick of corrupting people whom you would have thought beyond further corruption. It is fine acting.

Indeed, all the actors are so fine that it makes your eyes pop. As for example: Henry Gibson plays Haven Hamilton, the reigning star of Grand Ole Opry, a masterful entertainer, an incomparable dispenser of potted charm, vainglorious as only very short men can be and with the confiding eyes of an adder.

Ronee Blakley, who is indeed a singer and songwriter in the Nashville style, plays the sweetheart of saccharine sound, now fighting off a nervous collapse to keep her claws on the summit. Allen Garfield, her husband/manager, is a combination of decency (a spectacular attribute in the context) and tough business in a tough game.

Keith Carradine (who wrote the songs he sings) is a self-intoxicated seducer, but I was interested that in Nashville sex is such common coin that none of his women seems particularly upset at finding herself the object of cold and efficient lechery.

I'm omitting many more than I mention, but it doesn't tell much to run a list of names, with an E for excellence after each. They make up an extraordinary company. Several of them have worked with Altman before, but here, I would guess, they are performing beyond their own expectations. The whole company lived in Nashville during the shooting of the film, and they were caught by the spirit of the place (if "spirit" is the word I want). The only part I mistrusted, though Geraldine Chaplin does it with wit, is that of an English TV

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reporter (she says she's from the BBC, but it's hard to credit) whose Art Nouveau finery and finishing school pretensions seem laid on for laughs. It's the only easy gagging in *Nashville*; most of the guffaws arise from genuine situations and many will come back to haunt you.

Of course, Altman's film is not "a picture of America"; it isn't even a slice of that picture. *Nashville* is not fair or balanced; it doesn't pretend to be. It is a wild fantasy, a bouncy, brilliant and cruel caricature of the sort of people some of us are at least some of the time. It's easy to evade—saying "not me"—but it's not easy to forget. I suspect that, during this Bicentennial Year, people will see in our towns and cities more traces of Nashville than of Concord—in fact, you could hardly hold a Bicentennial celebration without playing into Altman's hands. I gather he is proud of himself; he has reason. □

ART

LAWRENCE ALLOWAY

In the two previous years members of the Art Dealers' Association have arranged an end-of-season New Talent Festival. There were about eighty artists in fourteen galleries the first time and about 100 in eighteen galleries last year (*The Nation*, June 25, 1973 and June 29, 1974). It represented the biggest concerted public action the ADA has made, but this year it has been dropped. As far as I know, only two galleries have exhibitions under the title "New Talent"—the Forum Gallery and Robert Schoelkopf, both on Madison Avenue. It was always an uptown operation, an attempt to remind artists and their public that, despite the concentration of new artists down in Soho, uptown was alive and well.

One gallery representative said that his gallery did not do it this year because he did not want to upstage the last Whitney Biennial, which included a lot of new names but was poorly received. Whatever the real reason, it was based on a collective decision by the dealers not to allot space to new artists. It cannot be the economic squeeze, because rent has to be paid whether the gallery is open or not. It could be that the difficulty many dealers have in identifying new talent has prompted them to drop the project. If so, it is a mistake for the aging uptown galleries to withdraw from the generations that they least understand. The decision confirms their isolation and will make new artists more than ever oriented toward downtown. However, I recommend the painters at the Forum Gallery, especially Dan Gustin for his bold, dark-toned, post-Hopperesque street scenes (until June 27).

"Seascape and the American Imagination" is the third of a series of thematic studies of 19th-century American art at the Whitney Museum (until September 9). The first was "The American Frontier" (*The Nation*, July 30, 1973) and the second "The Painters' America" (*The Nation*, November 2, 1974), and it must be admitted that the paintings in the new show do not equal their predecessors. Marine iconography turns out to be neither as vivid as that of the frontier nor as copious as that of genre. Specialization in art can lead to the insights that follow from obsession. The topographies of Canaletto or the horse portraits of George Stubbs are proof of that, but total immersion in marine imagery has not produced comparable masters.

Pat Hills, curator of the first two shows, acted as liaison between the Whitney and guest curator Roger B. Stein, and the sociological emphases of her shows are maintained. Stein pinpoints the patriotic effects on art of the War of 1812, the celebration of commercial enterprise, and the development of coastal leisure scenes. His catalogue text shows that American economic and social history penetrates marine painting. One supposed they would and he shows that they do. Stein also aims to show that American and European marine art are different, but that is more complicated.

It is one thing to set art into the social matrix within which it arose, but it is another to show the New World striking off the chains of the Old, while producing much the same kind of art. Stein tries to find differences between 17th-century Dutch marines, their 18th-century English derivatives, and the 19th-century American derivatives of them both. On the whole, tradition and inertia seem more conspicuous than some presumed new and authentically American touch (openness, candor, a different light). It was a mistake to try to deal with the synchronic phenomena of art and culture and, at the same time, with a hypothetical cross-cultural succession. The text yaws between convincing tie-ups of art and social history and hackneyed speculation on inherent native style. That topic became a cliché in the 19th century and the hypotheses of nationalistic historians of ideas have not advanced the idea much since then.

The exhibition's early and later periods are not strong. "Watson and the Shark" by John Singleton Copley, called by Stein "a bold new statement in the seascape tradition and a major landmark in the history of Western art" is not in the show. Stein points out that seascape imagery proliferated in popular culture and certainly, if one's interest is thematic, this is essential material. He lists the "rich and varied expressions of the popular imagination" in carvings on whalebone, wall paintings, political banners, advertisements, transfer patterns on porcelain, and yachting trophies. In addition to the tradition of painting, therefore, there is a wealth of ancillary material, often of absorbing interest.

Mass culture represents a problem that neither Hills nor Stein has solved: how to bring together the *elect* form of



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painting with the diffuse material to which it is bound iconographically. They are working to expand the interpretation of painting by reference to a wide cultural context, but they have not yet taken hold of this larger field. If their socially conscious reading of American art is to be fully validated, it must expand to take in artifacts of culture beyond those already sanctioned by art history and museum custom. Otherwise such studies are only revisionist within circumspect limits and do not ultimately transcend their academic base. In the meantime, Stein's profile of American marine art is clear and useful. One will be able to read much better all those harbor views and shipwrecks, men-o'-war and whalers, that have come to port in all those small American museums. □

RECORDS

DAVID HAMILTON

"The Heifetz Collection." Jascha Heifetz, violin; various accompaniments. Volume 1 (1917-1924), The Complete Acoustic Recordings. RCA Red Seal ARM4-0942. Volume 2 (1925-1934), The First Electrical Recordings. RCA Red Seal ARM4-0943. Volume 3 (1935-1937), Early Recordings of Concertos, Sonatas, and Encores. RCA Red Seal ARM4-0944. Volume 4 (1937-1941), Great Concertos—Great Conductors. RCA Red Seal ARM4-0945. Volume 5 (1946-1949), The End of An Era. RCA Red Seal ARM4-0946. Volume 6 (1950-1955), The New Era. Red Seal ARM4-0947. Four discs each, mono. $27.92 each.

Last year, RCA assembled the complete recordings of Sergei Rachmaninoff—less than we might have wished, for although his searching musical mind made distinctive and individual even the most trivial encore piece, Rachmaninoff recorded few major works except his own. This year's comparable effort on behalf of Jascha Heifetz is less comprehensive, extending only to 1955: virtually all his later recordings are currently available, and the numerous earlier ones still listed are also omitted here, along with some less explicable random exclusions and the wartime pops series for Decca (among which the obbligato for Bing Crosby's singing of *White Christmas* must have been some kind of high point). Still, this is perhaps more Heifetz than we need, for the musical personality that confronts us in sixteen concertos, thirteen sonatas, and well over 100 encore pieces (more than a few of them in two versions) hardly ever changes.

The first track of Volume 1 is a 1917 recording of Schubert's *Ave Maria* in the Wilhelmj arrangement: once through on the G string, once again in altitudinous double stops with a fluttering piano accompaniment, culminating in a grotesque transformation of the original song's cadential gesture. The intonation is fantastically secure, the weight of the tone carries strongly through the surface noise and the frequency limitations of the acoustic recording system. The bow never leaves the strings, tying all of Schubert's phrases into one stream of tone—a meaningless stream, alas, so inflected with slides, leanings, delays that the rhythmic and phrase structure is rendered incoherent. This performance is not about Schubert at all, of course—it's about the rock-steady bow arm, the infallible fingers. Its climaxes have to do with the surmounting of violinistic obstacles, not with musical shape.

"The style of the times," someone will probably say. Not necessarily (and no excuse in any case). Listen to Ysaÿe's still earlier recording of the song (in an admittedly more tasteful transcription), which yields musical sense despite a degree of portamento and rhythmic freedom now considered excessive. The "style of the times" did not preclude coherence, any more than today's more austere style guarantees it.

The Heifetz "coolness" is fabled, but a deceptive quality. True, his poise and facility are frequently counterproductive in expressive terms, but the playing is often "hot" in another dimension, melodic activity. He cannot leave things alone; the pleasure inherent in a simple line of even notes seems to elude him, and he teases the notes, faster and slower, louder and softer, making asymmetrical groupings that surprise but do not illuminate—indeed, rather obscure. The figuration and passage work of the great concertos is shaped with no sense of longer-range destination, only with hundreds of local "hot spots" that preclude any sense of grandeur, repose, or expansiveness at points where such are clearly desirable. At the first fiddle entry in the Beethoven concerto, or at the return of the slow movement theme in the Brahms, Heifetz has all the technical advantages over Szigeti (to name but one of his great contemporaries), who cannot quite keep things in tune—but one is eloquent in his imperfection, the other a perfect gabble.

There's a lot of gabbling on these forty-eight sides, from a ludicrous transcription of Couperin's *Les petits moulins-à-vent* to the profundities of two unaccompanied Bach sonatas from 1935 (like the Couperin and several other items, these have not been previously issued in this country): in the Presto of the G minor Sonata, where Bach has laid a three-unit melodic figure over a two-unit pulse, Heifetz sounds simply confused, and one turns elsewhere to hear the intended ambiguity made explicit. (For example, to Szigeti again; his recordings of this sonata, the Beethoven and Brahms concertos, and other central works of the literature will be found in Columbia M6X 31513, the *locus classicus* of musicianly fiddling in the first half of the century.)

The composer who comes off best in all of this is William Walton, whose concerto was written for Heifetz—perhaps with tongue in cheek. Besides exploiting the celebrated poise in stratospheric ranges, Walton builds into his themes precisely the kinds of scoops and glissandos that he evidently suspected Heifetz would employ anyway—and elsewhere keeps his soloist so busy with challenges of velocity that there isn't time to muck around with the shapes.

Another work that Heifetz served well was the Sibelius concerto, in the famous recording with Beecham (it isn't in the RCA series, but was recently reissued on Seraphim 60221). Despite more than a modicum of overplaying in the slow movement, here is intensity, panache and the kind of coloristic imagination that one rarely hears from Heifetz; for once, he communicates a "demon fiddler" image.

The sonata recordings are pretty uniformly disastrous, if only because of the salon weight of most of the pianists. Brahms's syncopations simply won't come off against the flaccid metrical impulse of Emanuel Bay (Sonata No. 2), even were Heifetz to phrase with force and clarity—and he does not manage that when offered the decidedly more plangent collaboration of William Kapell (Sonata No. 3)—while the engineers usually see to it that the pianists couldn't be obtrusive even if they tried.

From a bow-and-fingers standpoint, there is surely much here to excite wonder, especially in classic onomatopoetic stunts like Bazzini's *Ronde des lutins* or Rimsky's *Bumblebee*. But reflection upon these eighteen hours or so of fiddling summons up hardly a phrase that lifts the spirit, broadens perceptions, speaks directly in accents of simplicity and musical truth. The most trivial of encores might have been so illuminated, and the saddest thing about these records is that it never happens, either in the *Valse bluette* or the Beethoven concerto. □

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FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 Something should, for a good spell. (4, 4,1,5)
9 Just now appearing in China's centennial. . . . (7)
10 . . . and an Egyptian title given over a century ago. (7)
11 One might in starting the story of how a minor collision may end. (6)
12 A valeric change in the manner of such as Charles. (8)
14 Alga, possibly. (7)
15 War might be—on a salary? (5)
17 I objectively returned, and came across the less familiar name of a social worker. (5)
19 Carry a challenge in your suitcase, perhaps? (7)
21 Measured by the feet, obviously. (5,3)
23 See 8 down
25 Start the tune with something fresh (we hope). (4,3)
26 What none but the brave deserve? (7)
27 Sounds as though someone brought a ringer to the dance? (5,2,3,4)

DOWN

1 and 21 down Character proving a little ursine. (6,3,4)
2 Lives with unnatural desires? (7)
3 Get ready to have a child with an old street singer? That's the way to catch someone! (3,2,4)
4 A bird may fly better because of its tail. (4)
5 When the kids trip over their feet? (7,3)
6 Any he-animal gets shook up, but one just laughs. (5)
7 Sounds like the rule for pouring. (7)
8 and 23 across Evidently I'm accompanied by 21 down, if you'll just be patient! (4,4,2)
13 It might be the express law golfers break. (5,5)
15 Possibly a more wise description might be tedious. (9)
16 It certainly doesn't mean you've got it all together, making up lips as red as this. (9)
18 The cutter came the wrong way, evidently. (7)
20 This remarkable animal can hide in disguise. (7)
21 See 1 down
22 A long drawn-out speech. (5)
24 Short statement in passing? (4)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1591

ACROSS: 1 and 20 Every dog has his day; 9 Ring toss; 10 Redeal; 11 Instead; 12 Vandyke; 14 Gambit; 15 Fleabite; 17 Take care; 24 Aground; 26 Untrue; 27 Outbreak; 28 Comeuppance. DOWN: 2 and 25 Vegetable soup; 3 Riot act; 4 and 8 Dust jacket; 5 Germane; 6 Added; 7 Zinnia; 13 and 22 After the fact; 16 Bishopric; 18 Athens; 19 Accrete; 20 High tea; 21 Annual; 23 Fargo.

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

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